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This paper proposes and characterises a new normative solution concept for
Kydland and Prescott problems, allowing for a commitment device. A policy choice
is dominated if either (a) an alternative exists that is superior to it in a time-
consistent subdomain of the constraint set, or (b) an alternative exists that Pareto-
dominates it over time. Policies may be time-consistently undominated where time-
consistent optimality is not possible. We derive necessary and suﬃcient conditions
for this to be true, and show that these are equivalent to a straightforward but
signiﬁcant change to the ﬁrst-order conditions that apply under Ramsey policy.
Time-consistently undominated policies are an order of magnitude simpler than
Ramsey choice, whilst retaining normative appeal. This is illustrated across a range
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1 Introduction
1.1 Overview
Time inconsistency is an endemic problem in the macroeconomic policy literature. Whether
monetary, taxation or social insurance policy, very few meaningful questions can be an-
swered without encountering it in some form. It arises whenever policy must be designed
for environments where expectations of future outcomes aﬀect agents' current actions.
This dependence provides an incentive to make promises about future policy that it will
not be optimal to keep. As a consequence, the `best' choice of policy instruments for a
given time period depends on when this choice is being assessed  is it best ex-ante, or con-
temporaneously? The implied inconsistency in optimal choice was formalised by Kydland
and Prescott (1977), and its consequences have been widely studied by macroeconomists
ever since.
By deﬁnition, time inconsistency means that it is not possible to choose a dynamic
allocation that will be optimal from the perspective of every time period in succession.
A plan that is optimal initially will not be optimal to continue with. The conventional
response to this in the normative policy literature is to surrender the principle of successive
optimality, and focus on selections that are best from the perspective of the initial time
period only. This has commonly come to be known as `Ramsey' policy design, following
the foundational contribution to optimal tax design of Frank Ramsey (1927). It is a
method that has been widely applied in many diﬀerent policy environments.
An alternative approach, comparatively underexplored, is to surrender the principle
of optimality, and ask whether there exist weaker normative criteria that can be time-
consistently satisﬁed by some dynamic plan. That is, if no policy is best from the per-
spective of every period, might there nonetheless be options that always remain tolerably
good? This is the basic problem that our paper investigates.
Note that this is diﬀerent from the widely-studied positive question: What is the
equilibrium outcome of discretionary policy choice? A discretionary outcome is commonly
considered a normative failure, implying a lower welfare level in every period than could
be attained through a feasible commitment. This is the well-known `rules beat discretion'
result.
Our analysis departs from this positive approach in the equilibrium concept used: we
assume that policy precommitment is possible. Given this, we diﬀer from the Ramsey
approach in the solution concept used. In the set of feasible commitments, we seek
a policy that exhibits appealing normative properties consistently through time; the
Ramsey approach seeks a choice that is optimal for just one period  the ﬁrst.
Clearly the strength of our approach will rest on what exactly is meant by `appealing
normative properties' here. The analytical device we use to formalise this is the idea
2
of dominated selections. Even when a general choice problem is subject to time incon-
sistency, some policy comparisons may be viewed as less contentious than others. For
instance, it might be possible to isolate a subset of the available options, and ﬁnd that
for choice in this subset alone, no time inconsistency problem even exists. If this is true,
a sub-optimal choice in the restricted subset is surely not desirable for the problem as
a whole. Alternatively, it may be that in a pair of feasible alternatives, one option is
preferred to the other at every current and future point in time. In this case a Pareto
criterion, applied through time, can rule out the inferior choice.
Our paper formalises this reasoning. We endow the space of feasible commitments
with an incomplete `dominance' ordering at any given point in time. Where it exists, this
ordering always agrees with the policymaker's preferences, but like the Pareto principle
it will leave many pairs of options unranked. Its construction is based on the principles
outlined in the previous paragraph. First, in time-consistent subdomains, standard choice
is assumed to apply. Second, where the Pareto principle can be applied over time, it is.
The idea is that these represent relatively uncontroversial choice principles, even in the
wider context of time inconsistency.
Since the dominance ordering agrees with standard policy preferences wherever it
exists, the resulting set of undominated allocations will be larger than  and contain 
the more exclusive set of optimal choices in each period. Time-consistent membership
of the undominated set may thus be possible where time-consistent membership of the
optimal set is not. This is the basic normative argument that we pursue.
Given this approach, our main analytical contribution is to characterise necessary and
suﬃcient conditions for policies to belong to the undominated set in every time period.
These are the `time-consistently undominated policies' to which the paper's title refers.
We apply these characterisation results to a number of textbook examples, highlighting
the diﬀerences relative to Ramsey choice in particular. In a version of the Judd (1985)
capital tax problem, time-consistently undominated capital taxes satisfy an intuitively
simple eﬃciency-equity trade-oﬀ in all periods, and are generally positive. In a social
insurance problem with one-sided limited commitment, time-consistently undominated
policy involves a stable consumption distribution, with a progressive eﬀective marginal
savings tax. In a social insurance problem with asymmetric information, à la Atkeson
and Lucas (1992), time-consistently undominated policy induces a stable consumption
distribution where Ramsey policy implies an immiseration result.
Central to the general characterisation is a novel set of restrictions on the Lagrange
multipliers that attach to dynamic promise-keeping constraints in each period. These
multipliers are well-studied objects in the literature on Kydland and Prescott problems,
following the work of Marcet and Marimon (1998, 2017). Intuitively they summarise the
way that policy balances the prior value of keeping promises with the contemporaneous
cost. Ramsey policy requires the multipliers to be highly persistent through time, mean-
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ing that the demands of past promises ultimately come to dominate policy choice. Under
time-consistently undominated policy the multipliers instead exhibit gradual decay, at
a rate that coincides approximately with the policymaker's discount factor. This has
signiﬁcant implications for the character of policy, particularly in the long run.
1.2 Why study this problem?
Our motivation for investigating time-consistent normative solution concepts derives prin-
cipally from unease expressed in the literature about the properties of Ramsey policy.
This remains the main benchmark when generating policy advice, but at least three
distinct features make its suitability for practical recommendations questionable.
The ﬁrst issue relates to the arbitrariness of date-contingent choice. Under Ramsey
policy, the optimal instrument choice varies systematically in the amount of time that
has elapsed since the initial optimisation period  `date zero'. Section 2 provides a sim-
ple example. This time variation occurs independently of any evolution in underlying
economic variables. A number of authors have argued that such a feature is either un-
desirable, implausible, or both. As Svensson (1999) put it, What is special about date
zero?. This view has been particularly prominent in the New Keynesian monetary policy
literature, where it prompted Woodford (2003) to develop the widely-applied `timeless
perspective' approach to policy design. Though the approach we recommend ultimately
diﬀers from Woodford's, his search for a systematic decision procedure in the light of
which ... current actions are always to be justiﬁed is precisely our focus.1
A second issue with the Ramsey approach relates to its long-run dynamics. There are
a number of settings in which the long-run outcomes of a Ramsey-optimal plan can be
extremely undesirable in isolation. In many dynamic asymmetric information settings,
for instance, it may be Ramsey-optimal to drive the consumption of almost all agents to
zero as time progresses  even though the policymaker is utilitarian. An example based
on Atkeson and Lucas (1992) is given in Section 9.3 below. The deeper problem is that
an optimal choice for date zero need not exhibit any clear desirability properties when
reassessed at a later point in time. A time-consistent normative choice technique can
overcome this by design.
A third feature of Ramsey policy that may be problematic is its relative inﬂexibility. A
Ramsey plan is deﬁned as a set of instrument choices that are optimal from the perspective
of date zero. This is crucially dependent on the model of the economy that is adopted in
date zero. In practice every model of the economy will come to be updated and improved,
in ways that cannot easily be foreseen. How the Ramsey plan should be aﬀected when this
occurs is a very diﬃcult problem. Full reoptimisation, treating the current period as a
new `date zero', could be viewed as a violation of the past commitment; but retaining the
1Woodford (2003),  7.1, p. 474.
4
existing plan is surely suboptimal. There is no easy intermediate position. Our approach
can again overcome this issue. It allows the appropriateness of a policy to be assessed on
a rolling basis, without any dependence on past perspectives to motivate choice.
Though we ﬁnd these arguments interesting and forceful, we also stress that their
validity is not our principal concern. It is clear that reasonable doubts can exist about
the appropriateness of Ramsey policy in certain settings. So long as this is true, it makes
sense as a practical matter to investigate normative alternatives.
1.3 Related literature
1.3.1 Commitment, discretion and rules
Since the seminal contribution of Kydland and Prescott (1977), a vast number of papers
have engaged with the general problem of time inconsistency  both from a normative
and a positive perspective. With the exception of the New Keynesian literature, dis-
cussed below, the dominant normative focus has been on Ramsey policy, with signiﬁcant
innovations over the years in its characterisation and computation. The work on dynamic
games by Abreu, Pearce and Stachetti (1990), and on recursive saddle-point problems
by Marcet and Marimon (1998, 2017) has provided alternative devices for representing
the Ramsey problem in recursive form.2 Our characterisation results, below, are stated
in terms of the promise multipliers whose use Marcet and Marimon popularised, and are
easiest to interpret by comparison with their work.
The positive literature on time inconsistency considers the implications for policy and
welfare of a lack of commitment. Here there are important diﬀerences in the equilibrium
concept used. The majority of papers seek Markov-perfect equilibria.3 These allow
no scope for promises to bind choice, though strategic incentives to inﬂuence future
decisions can aﬀect the choice of endogenous states. Outcomes are generally ineﬃcient,
with commitment strategies delivering welfare improvements from the perspective of every
time period.4
A smaller, though highly inﬂuential, literature focuses on history-contingent reputa-
tional equilibria.5 This `sustainable plans' approach characterises the set of policies that
2Though Abreu, Pearce and Stachetti (1990) wrote on dynamic games, there have been many appli-
cations of their work in the macroeconomics literature, including Kocherlakota (1996a), Chang (1998)
and Phelan and Stachetti (2001).
3Examples include Klein and Ríos-Rull (2003), Ortigueira (2006), Ellison and Rankin (2007), Klein,
Krusell and Ríos-Rull (2008), Diaz-Giménez, Giovannetti, Marimon and Teles (2008), Martin (2009),
Blake and Kirsanova (2012), Reis (2013), Niemann, Pichler and Sorger (2013), Bianchi and Mendoza
(2013), and Debortoli, Nunes and Yared (2017).
4A related branch of work is the `loose commitment' approach developed by Debortoli and Nunes
(2010). This sits between the positive and normative branches of the literature, analysing the outcomes
of optimal policy problems when reoptimisation is known to take place at random intervals through time.
5Chari and Kehoe (1990) and Atkeson (1991) were pioneering early papers. More recent work of
this kind in the social insurance literature includes Sleet and Yeltekin (2006), Sleet and Yeltekin (2008),
Acemoglu, Golosov and Tsyvinski (2010), Farhi, Sleet, Werning and Yeltekin (2012) and Golosov and
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can be supported by appropriate trigger strategies in an inﬁnite horizon. The threat
of reversion to an inferior equilibrium can allow some promises to be kept, though the
Ramsey strategy is usually not attainable. A common feature of this literature is inde-
terminacy: the set of sustainable equilibria is large, though  mirroring Ramsey policy 
it is common to focus on the best sustainable equilibria from the perspective of the initial
time period.
The variant on this literature that comes closest to our work is Kocherlakota (1996b),
who introduces a reﬁnement that he dubs reconsideration-proofness to the problem of
ﬁnding a sustainable plan. Developed in a purely stationary environment, this recom-
mends selecting an equilibrium that is best, subject to the assumption that future pol-
icymakers will be allowed to select in exactly the same manner. This naturally leads
to the best constant choice over time. This exactly coincides with our symmetric time-
consistently undominated policy in examples without state variables, though it is not
directly applicable to models with states.
1.3.2 The timeless perspective
The problem of ﬁnding a time-consistent normative solution concept in Kydland and
Prescott problems has been most directly framed in the New Keynesian literature. The
`timeless perspective' method proposed by Woodford (1999, 2003) recommends imple-
menting in all periods a policy rule that is consistent with the long-run outcome under
Ramsey policy. This method remains commonly applied across a range of problems in
monetary policy design, particularly in linear-quadratic environments.6
Our results sound a note of caution about the timeless perspective. We show that the
long-run continuation of Ramsey policy can generically be Pareto-dominated by alterna-
tive feasible selections. This makes the justiﬁcation for choosing it appear weak.7 This
is particularly evident in the example of Section 2, where the timeless perspective policy
would select a constant inﬂation-output combination that is strictly inferior to alternative
feasible constant policies.
1.3.3 Variable social discounting
The immiseration result is commonly regarded as a troubling conclusion per se, and work
by Phelan (2006) and Farhi and Werning (2007) investigates options for overcoming it.
Like our paper, the approach of these authors is explicitly normative, with the assumption
of a perfect commitment device. Unlike our paper, the essential strategy that Phelan
Iovino (2014).
6Recent papers making use of it include Giannoni and Woodford (2017), Armenter (2017), Cúrdia
and Woodford (2016), Engel (2014), Benigno and Paciello (2014), Adam and Woodford (2012), Benigno
and Woodford (2012), and Corsetti, Dedola and Leduc (2010).
7The desirability of the timeless approach has been already questioned in the context of a linear-
quadratic New Keynesian problem by Blake (2001). See also Damjanovic, Damjanovic and Nolan (2008).
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(2006) and Farhi and Werning (2007) propose is to raise the societal discount factor. This
is justiﬁed on ﬁrst principles as identifying an alternative position on the intergenerational
Pareto frontier.
There is a long tradition in economic policy design, dating at least to Ramsey (1928),
that recommends a higher societal discount factor relative to private-sector preferences.
Whether this is appropriate or not is a deeply contentious question, and we do not
propose to resolve it here. We note simply that it implies a more substantial change
to the principles of policy design than our paper. Our method is deliberately designed
to preserve standard choice in time-consistent environments. As the example of Section
9.3 shows, it is possible to overcome the immiseration result just by amending choice
principles for the time-inconsistent aspects of a problem.
1.4 Paper outline
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 outlines a simple linear-quadratic problem that
further illustrates the motivation for what we do. Section 3 presents a general problem
that we use to develop the main ideas, and discusses some key assumptions. Sections 4
and 5 describe, in turn, the dominance ordering that we place on the space of feasible
allocations, and how choice can be conducted in light of this ordering. Section 6 shows
that this choice problem can be divided into a two-stage procedure, with a time-consistent
`inner' problem that takes promises as given, and a time-inconsistent `outer' problem that
is concerned with the choice of promises. This is a crucial step in operationalising our
approach.
Section 7 provides necessary and suﬃcient conditions for policies to be time-consistently
undominated, and shows that conventional normative and positive approaches do not
satisfy these. Section 8 shows that time-consistently undominated policies have a dual
interpretation as promise choices that are optimal for every period along one choice di-
mension. This is used to add an appealing symmetry reﬁnement to our approach, allowing
multiplicity to be overcome. Section 9 applies our approach to three textbook settings: a
capital tax problem, a social insurance problem with limited commitment, and a dynamic
asymmetric information problem. Section 10 concludes.
2 Motivating example
The introductory discussion can be clariﬁed by exploring a simple example. This sec-
tion explains the problem of normative choice in the context of a linear-quadratic New
Keynesian inﬂation bias problem with no uncertainty.8 With just two variables and one
8The problem is studied for its simplicity rather than its realism. More detailed foundations for it
are discussed in Woodford (2003),  7.1.
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linear constraint, the environment is as simple as possible.
2.1 Setup
Time is discrete, and runs inﬁnitely from some initial period 0. The supply side of the
economy in period t is described by a linearised New Keynesian Phillips Curve:
pit = βEtpit+1 + γyt (1)
where pit is inﬂation in period t, yt is a measure of the output gap, Et is a standard
expectations operator and β ∈ (0, 1) and γ > 0 are parameters. Policy choice is assumed
to be across output and inﬂation sequences from 0 onwards, subject only to equation (1).
To keep notation compact we denote inﬁnite sequences by bold type with an overbar,
with subscripts giving the starting period, so y¯0 := {yt}∞t=0, p¯is := {pit}∞t=s, and so on.
2.2 The feasible set
Any pair (y¯s, p¯is) that satisﬁes (1) for all t ≥ s is a feasible choice from period s
onwards. For all s ≥ 0, deﬁne Ξ as the set of feasible policy sequences from s on:
Ξ = {(y¯s, p¯is) : (1) true for all t ≥ s}
Note that Ξ is time-invariant. A pair of inﬂation and output sequences that is feasible
from s onwards would also be feasible from t onwards.
2.3 Time inconsistency and Ramsey choice
The central policy problem is to make a selection from Ξ. We assume a commitment
device, so that every element of Ξ can potentially be chosen. The focus is on the normative
properties of alternative selections.
In any given period s ≥ 0 the policymaker has a complete, rational preference ordering
over Ξ, described in the usual way by the objective function Ws:
Ws := −
∞∑
t=s
βt−s
[
pi2t + χ (yt − y∗)2
]
(2)
where y∗ > 0 is an optimal level for the output gap and χ > 0 is a parameter.
Ramsey policy is deﬁned as the selection
(
y¯R0 , p¯i
R
0
)
such that W0 is maximised on Ξ.
In this simple linear-quadratic environment it will be unique:
(
y¯R0 , p¯i
R
0
)
= arg max
(y¯0,p¯i0)∈Ξ
W0
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This policy is an important and widely-studied benchmark, but it is well known that
it is a time-inconsistent selection. It recommends values for pit and yt that are positive
initially, but tend jointly to zero as time progresses. Since the model is entirely stationary,
re-optimising in any period s > 0 would imply exactly the same dynamics, but starting
from s instead of 0. This means departing from the continuation of the period-zero
Ramsey plan. Hence `maximise Ws on Ξ' is not a time-consistent solution concept.
As is well known, the reason for the inconsistency is that constraint (1) contains the
forward-looking term Etpit+1. There is an incentive to make promises about future alloca-
tions in order to manage inﬂation expectations. When the future arises, the justiﬁcation
for keeping these promises has passed.
2.4 Time-consistent choice criteria
Time inconsistency implies that a policy cannot be optimal for every period. It can at best
either (a) be optimal from the perspective of just one period, or (b) be desirable in some
weaker sense, in every period. Choosing the Ramsey plan
(
y¯R0 , p¯i
R
0
)
means following the
ﬁrst approach, where period 0 is the date that is privileged. Our aim is to operationalise
the second approach.
The simplicity of the present example is helpful. Whatever time-consistent solution
concept we ultimately devise, in this stationary, deterministic environment it must deliver
a time-invariant inﬂation-output choice.9 The class of constant inﬂation-output combi-
nations is easy to investigate here, and provides useful insights that will later generalise.
Formally, we can deﬁne the set of feasible constant policy options as Ξc ⊂ Ξ:
Ξc := {(y¯0, p¯i0) ∈ Ξ : (yt, pit) = (ys, pis) for all t, s ≥ 0}
There is a unique choice that maximises Ws on Ξ
c for all s, which we label (y¯c0, p¯i
c
0)  the
optimal constant policy.10 It would be extremely hard to construct a normative case for
any constant choice other than this.
The puzzling aspect of this ﬁnding is that (y¯c0, p¯i
c
0) is not related in any obvious way
to the main policy benchmarks that exist in the literature. It is neither the long-run
outcome from Ramsey policy, nor the time-invariant Markov equilibrium. Figure 1 con-
trasts optimal constant policy with these outcomes for conventional parameter values.11
The Markov outcome is biased towards excessive inﬂation, and is clearly Pareto ineﬃ-
cient when considering the preferences of policymakers at diﬀering points in time. More
intriguingly, Figure 1 highlights that the continuation of Ramsey policy is also ineﬃcient
9If this were not true, re-applying the choice criterion in a later period would imply deviating from
any earlier selection.
10It is a simple exercise to show that this is given by yct =
χ(1−β)2
γ2+χ(1−β)2 y
∗ and pict =
χγ(1−β)
γ2+χ(1−β)2 y
∗ for all
t.
11We assume β = 0.96, γ = 0.024, χ = 0.048 and y∗ = 0.05.
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Figure 1: Ramsey, Markov and optimal constant policy
in this sense, once enough time has elapsed. For suﬃciently large s, all policymakers
from s onwards strictly prefer (y¯cs , p¯i
c
s) to
(
y¯Rs , p¯i
R
s
)
. Note that the limiting outcome of
Ramsey policy, with pit = yt = 0, is the `timeless perspective' policy recommended for
every period by Woodford (2003). This is clearly inferior to the optimal constant choice.
We can build on this discussion by deﬁning a Pareto dominance across pairs of allo-
cations in this example as follows:
Deﬁnition. Policy (y¯′s, p¯i
′
s) ∈ Ξ dominates the alternative (y¯′′s , p¯i′′s) ∈ Ξ in period s ≥ 0
if there exists ε > 0 such that Wt is higher under (y¯
′
t, p¯i
′
t) than (y¯
′′
t , p¯i
′′
t) by at least an
amount ε for all t ≥ s.
A policy (y¯′s, p¯i
′
s) ∈ Ξ is undominated in period s if there is no alternative in Ξ that
dominates it in s. Note that the set of undominated policies in s will always contain
the optimal policy to implement from s onwards, but it will generally contain many
other elements too. Moreover, the optimal choice in s may come to be dominated in
continuation in periods subsequent to s. Figure 1 conﬁrms that this is true of the Ramsey
policy. We will seek time-consistently undominated policies:
Deﬁnition. A policy (y¯′0, p¯i
′
0) ∈ Ξ is time-consistently undominated if its continua-
tion (y¯′s, p¯i
′
s) is undominated for all s ≥ 0.
We have the following result:12
Proposition 1. The optimal constant policy (y¯c0, p¯i
c
0) is time-consistently undominated.
This is non-trivial, because (y¯cs , p¯i
c
s) is shown to be undominated in the entire set
Ξ, not just the restricted set Ξc in which it is optimal. Given the chosen deﬁnition of
dominance, it shows by example that time-consistently undominated policies can exist in
environments where time-consistently optimal policies do not. Weakening the normative
12Proofs of Propositions are collected in Appendix A.
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Figure 2: Three time-consistently undominated policies
requirement from `optimal' to `undominated' thus yields a choice criterion that can be
asserted in all periods. Moreover, the resulting policy is qualitatively distinct from the
main positive and normative benchmarks in the literature.
2.5 Multiplicity
An important qualiﬁcation to this result is that the optimal constant policy is not the only
time-consistently undominated selection available. Figure 2 charts two others alongside
it. The policy labeled `limiting path' involves a strictly higher inﬂation rate initially,
approaching the optimal constant choice at the limit as time passes. Because the two
are equivalent at the limit, the strict Pareto dominance requirement is not met for any
ε > 0.13 The other policy, labeled `ﬂuctuating path' sees inﬂation and output follow
a two-period cycle, permanently ﬂuctuating about their optimal constant values. This
highlights that the multiplicity of time-consistently undominated solutions is not just a
`transition' issue. There are time-consistently undominated paths that never converge to
the optimal constant solution.
Though it rules out important benchmarks, it is clear that the dominance criterion
alone does not deliver a unique time-consistent selection. If uniqueness is desired, some
further reﬁnement is necessary. Yet it is also clear that, at least in this example, there
is one `obvious' candidate for a reﬁnement  the optimal constant policy. As well as
being an order of magnitude simpler, this is the only selection that treats all periods
symmetrically.
2.6 Summary
The general lessons from this example can be summarised as follows:
13Given this, it is clear that a weaker Pareto criterion would not allow time-consistent choice.
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1. In a model without states or shocks, selection from the set of constant policies is a
time-consistent choice procedure.
2. The solution to this problem is nether the outcome of a Markovian, discretionary
equilibrium, nor the long-run outcome observed under Ramsey policy.
3. The optimal constant policy is time-consistently undominated, according to a strict
Pareto criterion.
4. Many other policies are also time-consistently undominated by this criterion, but
all of these imply asymmetries in policy choice through time.
The analysis that follows will generalise all four of these insights.
3 General setup
We develop the theory in a general setting that nests a number of the most well-known
Kydland and Prescott problems. As above, sequences are written using bold type with
an overbar, with subscripts to denote starting period. Superscripts are used to denote
the end period of a ﬁnite sequence where necessary. Thus x¯s := {xt}t≥s, x¯rs := {xt}rt=s,
and so on. (x¯r−1∗s , x¯
′
r) denotes the combined sequence
{
x∗s, x
∗
s+1, ..., x
∗
r−1, x
′
r, x
′
r+1, ...
}
.
3.1 Preliminaries
Time is discrete, and runs from period 0 to inﬁnity. We abstract from aggregate risk for
simplicity. The framework allows settings with idiosyncratic risk across large populations
of agents.
In each period t ≥ 0 there is a vector of n predetermined `state' variables xt−1 ∈
X ⊂ Rn, with xt to be chosen in t, and a vector of m non-predetermined variables
at (σ) ∈ Aσ ⊂ Rm deﬁned for all σ ∈ Σ, where σ is an identiﬁer variable  possibly
stochastic  discussed in more detail below, and Σ is the set of possible σ realisations.
We deﬁne at ∈ A as {at (σ)}σ∈Σ, with A := {Aσ}σ∈Σ.
The role of σ varies ﬂexibly across examples, but in general it is used to index the
set of forward-looking constraints that are of relevance in any given time period. In
environments with heterogeneous agents subject to idiosyncratic risk, for instance, each
particular σ ∈ Σ will correspond to a distinct history of exogenous shocks. Individuals
with diﬀerent shock histories may receive diﬀerent allocations, and so for each σ a distinct
forward-looking restriction may be required. In deterministic environments with multiple
forward-looking constraints, σ can be used as a simple index on these constraints.
We assume that Σ is a time-invariant set. In stochastic environments this means
that the quantity of information on past shocks across individuals is stationary, not
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accumulating over time. This may imply that detailed shock histories for diﬀerent agents
are known even at the start of time, which is a departure from convention in many
settings. It would not make a diﬀerence for policy results if histories up to period 0 were
generated ﬁctitiously, so this information requirement is not a practical impediment to
applying our approach.
σ is assumed to follow a Markov process over time, with the conditional probability
measure Π (S|σ) giving the probability of S ⊆ Σ in period t + 1, given that σ is drawn
in t. Where the meaning is obvious, expectations with respect to this measure will be
represented by Et. The conditional measure Π (·|σ) is assumed to be time-invariant. In
addition, there is an unconditional probability measure across the elements in Σ, denoted
Π (S) for all S ⊂ Σ, also independent of time. This satisﬁes a standard consistency
property:
Π (S) =
ˆ
σ∈Σ
Π (S|σ) dΠ (σ)
for all S ⊂ Σ.
In environments with idiosyncratic risk, it will often be desirable to link current
allocations to individuals' past histories. For this, it is helpful to assume that σ is `fully
revealing' of past type, deﬁned as follows:
Deﬁnition. σ′ ∈ Σ is fully revealing of past type if there exist S ⊂ Σ with σ′ ∈ S such
that there is just one σ ∈ Σ with Π (S|σ) > 0.
Assumption 1. For all σ ∈ Σ, σ is fully revealing of past type.
This assumption, combined with the time-invariance of Σ, implies that in many ex-
amples of interest σ will correspond to a complete inﬁnite sequence of past shock draws.
The problem in period s is to select a sequence of the form (x¯s, a¯s)∈ X × A, where
X ×A is the space of inﬁnite sequences of elements in X ×A. X and A are taken to be
Banach spaces, equipped with a norm ‖·‖. A generic element of X ×A is referred to as
an allocation. This choice problem will be subject to a set of constraints to be discussed
below.
3.2 Social preferences
The set of allocations X × A is ordered in generic period s according to some social
preference ranking. This ranking is described by the function Ws:
Ws :=
∞∑
t=s
βt−s
ˆ
σ∈Σ
r (at (σ) , σ) dΠ (σ) (3)
where r : Aσ × Σ → R is a within-period, σ-contingent preference function for period
s ≥ 0, and higher values of Ws correspond to more preferred outcomes.
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These preferences are dynamically recursive, and so are not themselves a source of
time inconsistency. The assumption that r does not depend on any state variables is a
useful normalisation without signiﬁcant loss of generality. It is always possible to deﬁne
auxiliary constraints and variables that incorporate this dependence.14
It is useful to deﬁne many concepts directly by reference to the binary preference
relation that Ws describes on X × A. This will be denoted  for weak preference, with
 and ∼ denoting strict preference and indiﬀerence respectively. Thus (x¯′s, a¯′s)  (x¯′′s , a¯′′s)
if Ws is weakly higher under (x¯
′
s, a¯
′
s), and so on.
3.3 Constraints
There is an i-dimensional vector of `structural' feasibility restrictions linking the inherited
and future state vectors in X, and the current variables in A:
g (xt−1, xt, at) ≥ 0 (4)
where g : X × X × A → Ri. This must be satisﬁed for all t. An example would be
a simple within-period aggregate resource constraint of the form Yt − Ct − It ≥ 0, or a
capital accumulation equation of the form Kt ≤ (1− δ)Kt−1 + It.
Time inconsistency derives from a set of inﬁnite-horizon `forward-looking' constraints,
one for each σ ∈ Σ. These are generally assumed to take the form:
Et
[ ∞∑
τ=0
βτh (at+τ (σt+τ ) , σt+τ )
∣∣∣∣∣σt
]
≥ h0 (at (σt) , σt) (5)
where σt+τ ∈ Σ denotes a τ -period successor history to σt ∈ Σ, h : Aσ × Σ → R and
h0 : Aσ × Σ → R for all t ≥ 0. When planning choice in period s, condition (5) must
be satisﬁed for all σt ∈ Σ at all t ≥ s. The following assumption can be helpful in
guaranteeing the relevance of (5):
Assumption 2. For all σt ∈ Σ and a¯t+1 ∈ A, there exists at least one within-period
choice at ∈ A such that (5) is violated.
Assumption 2 helps to keep the constraint space simple in certain choice problems
that follow. It could be dispensed with quite easily, but there are expositional gains from
using it, as highlighted below.
14For instance, in a model that features consumption habits it is possible that the desired preference
criterion might take the form r (ct − λct−1) for some variable ct and parameter λ. In this case we can
deﬁne c˜t := ct − λct−1, and use this to suppress the dependence of r on the lagged variable ct−1. The
deﬁnition of c˜t then becomes one of the structural restrictions deﬁning the model.
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3.3.1 Discussion of constraint (5)
Some limits to generality are necessary to keep the discussion manageable, but constraint
(5) is suﬃciently ﬂexible to incorporate many of the canonical settings in which time
inconsistency features. As with the objective function r, for simplicity we have assumed
that state variables do not enter into h or h0. This ensures that the space of allocations
consistent with (5) alone will be time-invariant. The inﬁnite upper limit in the summation
is slightly restrictive, as it rules out examples where only ﬁnite-horizon expectations
matter. It is straightforward to extend our analysis to allow for such cases, but we avoid
doing this to economise on notation.15
A more signiﬁcant limitation of (5) is that it does not easily incorporate incentive-
compatibility constraints. Unlike (5), incentive restrictions generally require the right-
hand side also to be dependent on future policy choices, as individuals compare promised
outcomes under alternative behavioural strategies. A variant that would work for this
case is:
Et
[ ∞∑
τ=0
βτh (at+τ (σt+τ ) , σt+τ )
∣∣∣∣∣σt
]
≥ Et
[ ∞∑
τ=0
βτh (at+τ (σ˜t+τ ) , σt+τ )
∣∣∣∣∣σt
]
(6)
where σ˜t+τ can be viewed as an admissible type report τ periods after t, potentially
diﬀerent from the agent's true type. This sort of constraint is central to a number of
important environments where Kydland and Prescott problems matter, and we do not
wish to neglect it in the treatment. The general discussion is restricted to constraints
of type (5) to keep notation manageable, but Appendix C extends the main results to
problems with constraint (6), and Section 9.3 in the main text provides an application
based on the Atkeson and Lucas (1992) problem.
3.3.2 Equivalent h functions
In most settings the function h will have a clear economic interpretation  the within-
period level of utility for an agent, for instance, or within-period expenditure. This
interpretation conveys economic information beyond what is mathematically necessary
to preserve inequality (5), and it may be useful to compare h across dates and states on
the basis of this information. This will be particularly useful when formalising a notion
of symmetry through time in policy choice.
Formally, deﬁne an admissible equivalence transform as a function φ : R×N×Σ→
15In many cases the relevant constraint can be rewritten to match the form of (5) even when it does
not initially appear to do so. For instance, the New Keynesian Phillips curve in equation (1) can be
solved forward to give:
pit = γEt
∞∑
τ=0
βτyt+τ
When the equality is read as a two-sided inequality, this maps directly into (5).
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R that can be permitted to transform the h function in inequality (5) without changing
its economic content.16 As is well known, diﬀerent forms of comparability imply diﬀerent
admissible transforms. There are two main forms of comparability in h that we will
consider. The ﬁrst, and most widely applicable, is that h is diﬀerence comparable.
Deﬁnition. The function h is diﬀerence comparable if all admissible transforms take
the form:
φ (h, t, σ) = δh+ αt (σ)
where the scalar δ ∈ R+ is common across time and states, but the additive coeﬃcient
αt (σ) ∈ R can vary in both.
As the name suggests, this form of comparability allows changes to h to be meaning-
fully compared from one date-state to another. It is well known to be a necessary assump-
tion for utilitarian objectives to have meaning.17 Many important Kydland and Prescott
problems assume weighted utilitarian social objectives, whilst also featuring utility-based
forward-looking constraints. In these cases, diﬀerence comparability across agents' utility
functions is implicit in the choice of social welfare function. Diﬀerence comparability is
also an appropriate assumption to make when treating linearised models.
An alternative is for h to be ratio comparable.
Deﬁnition. The function h is ratio comparable if all admissible transforms take the
form:
φ (h, t, σ) = δt (σ)h
where δt (σ) ∈ R+ for all t and σ.
This form of comparability implies that proportional changes to h are independently
deﬁned. An example of an h function that is ratio comparable is one that speciﬁes an
agent's net expenditure within a given period. Proportional increases in expenditure have
meaning irrespective of the numeraire used to deﬁne value, and remain unaﬀected as that
numeraire is changed. This sort of function features in the implementability condition
for many dynamic Ramsey tax problems.
The comparability properties of h are a primitive feature of the economic environment
in any given example, deﬁned as part of the speciﬁcation of h.
3.4 The feasible set
We denote by Ξ (xs−1) the feasible set of allocations from period s onwards, given xs−1:
Ξ (xs−1) = {(x¯s, a¯s) ∈ (X ×A) : (4) & (5) true ∀σ ∈ Σ, ∀t ≥ s, given xs−1}
16Alongside this will be auxiliary transforms to the h0 function and the discount factor, so that the
mathematical structure of inequality (5) is preserved.
17See, for instance, Roberts (1980).
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Any chosen allocation from period s onwards must be drawn from this set.
It is also convenient to specify in isolation the set of allocations that is consistent
with the structural constraints in (4), and the set of allocations that is consistent with
the forward-looking constraints (5). The set of allocations that satisfy (4) for any given
xs−1 is denoted Ξg (xs−1):
Ξg (xs−1) = {(x¯s, a¯s) ∈ (X ×A) : (4) true ∀t ≥ s, given xs−1}
Similarly, the set of allocations that satisfy constraints (5) will be denoted Ξh:
Ξh = {(x¯s, a¯s) ∈ (X ×A) : (5) true ∀σt ∈ Σ, ∀t ≥ s}
This set is independent of the initial state vector, since by assumption these do not feature
in constraint (5).
3.4.1 Feasibility and possibility
The analysis will make use of an independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) condition
in what follows. This requires the universe of `irrelevant' alternatives to be speciﬁed. In
order that restrictions on the basic space (X ×A) do not impede the applicability of IIA,
we adopt the following technical normalisation when deﬁning the constituent space A:
Assumption 3. (Normalisation of A) Let Rh (σ), Rh
0
(σ) and Rr (σ) denote the ranges
of the functions h (·, σ), h0 (·, σ) and r (·, σ) respectively, for any given σ ∈ Σ. For any
three functions %h : Σ → Rh (σ), %h0 : Σ → Rh0 (σ) and %r : Σ → Rr (σ) there exists an
a ∈ A such that h (a, σ) = %h (σ), h0 (a, σ) = %h0 (σ) and r (a, σ) = %r (σ).
In words, any combination of values in the ranges of h (·, σ), h0 (·, σ) and r (·, σ) can
be attained by some choice of a in A. To the extent that cross-restrictions rule certain
combinations out, these restrictions are normalised to belong to the problem's constraints.
They do not describe the universe of possibilities.
This normalisation is suﬃcient, but by no means necessary for our purposes. It
provides the most general guarantee possible that non-existence of irrelevant alternatives
will never impede the analysis.
3.5 Structural assumptions
To place structure on the problem, we will impose the following assumptions on the main
primitives:
Assumption 4. The functions r, g, h, and h0 are continuous and bounded. The spaces
Aσ ⊂ Rm and X ⊂ Rn are compact and convex.
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Assumption 5. g is quasi-concave, h is concave, h0 is convex and r is strictly concave.
Assumption 4 provides essential structure and is imposed throughout. Compactness of
Aσ and X is its strongest component, as this implies bounds on the set of possible choices
that are unrelated to the problem's feasibility constraints. But without loss we can assume
that these bounds are set arbitrarily loosely, and never aﬀect the boundaries of the feasible
set Ξ (xs−1). Assumption 5 is imposed more selectively, as needed. Quasiconcavity in g
ensures that the constraint space Ξg (xs−1) is always convex, and will be useful for deriving
suﬃciency statements. The remaining concavity and convexity assumptions are needed
to obtain some suﬃciency results, and to apply the Lagrange multiplier theorem.
4 Ordering
This section provides an axiomatic description of the dominance ordering that we use.
4.1 Basic approach and rationality properties
The analysis proceeds by placing a pairwise ordering on the time-invariant space Ξh.
This ordering is denoted TC , and is constructed by reference to two axioms that are
deﬁned in this section. TC will be incomplete on Ξh, but where it exists it will always
agree with the policymaker's preference ranking . This immediately conveys certain
basic rationality properties on TC , such as the absence of any cycles in strict preference.
Reﬂexivity of TC will follow from the axioms, but transitivity is not imposed.18 The
axiomatisation constructs the strict and indiﬀerence orderings TC and ∼TC directly,
with TC meaning that either TC or ∼TC is true axiomatically.
Deﬁning TC on Ξh means that the ordering can diﬀer as the problem's forward-
looking constraints change, even for the same basic space X × A. This reﬂects the
centrality of the time-inconsistency problem to the construction of TC . By construction,
TC will be invariant to the feasibility restrictions that make up Ξg (xs−1).
4.2 Axiom 1: Constraint-based comparisons
The ﬁrst axiom is based on isolating restricted subsets of Ξh where choice is known to
be time-consistent. If the policy problem were restricted to these subsets alone, standard
choice techniques could apply without impediment. A standard independence argument
then implies that choice for the wider problem should not recover a selection that is
inferior within a subset of this kind. The ﬁrst axiom ensures this property.
18That is, (x¯′s, a¯
′
s) TC (x¯′′s , a¯′′s ) and (x¯′′s , a¯′′s ) TC (x¯′′′s , a¯′′′s ) need not imply (x¯′s, a¯′s) TC (x¯′′′s , a¯′′′s ),
since (x¯′s, a¯
′
s) and (x¯
′′′
s , a¯
′′′
s ) may not be ordered.
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4.2.1 Time-consistent comparability
The axiom is constructed based on a concept of time-consistent comparability across
allocations. This provides a formal description of the comparisons for which no time
inconsistency problem applies. Intuitively, these are comparisons that can safely be made
without any concern that forward-looking constraints could be violated at any horizon.
To formalise this, two auxiliary deﬁnitions are helpful. The ﬁrst is the idea of a composite
allocation. A composite is constructed by taking the within-period allocations from one
or other of a pair of sequences. Formally:
Deﬁnition. Fix a pair of allocations (x¯′s, a¯
′
s) , (x¯
′′
s , a¯
′′
s) ∈ X × A. The allocation (x¯∗s, a¯∗s)
is a composite of (x¯′s, a¯
′
s) and (x¯
′′
s , a¯
′′
s) iﬀ for all t ≥ s, (x∗t , a∗t ) ∈ {(x′t, a′t) , (x′′t , a′′t )}.
The second deﬁnition is of a complete set of allocations.
Deﬁnition. The set of allocations Ts ⊂ X×A is complete iﬀ for every pair (x¯′s, a¯′s) , (x¯′′s , a¯′′s) ∈
Ts, every composite of (x¯′s, a¯′s) and (x¯′′s , a¯′′s) also belongs to Ts.
The s subscript on Ts denotes the starting period for the sequences contained within
this set. Tt will then be used to denote the set of continuations of sequences in Ts, for
t > s, and so on.
Completeness in the set of options from s onwards guarantees time consistency in
future choice. Formally:
Proposition 2. Fix xs−1 ∈ X. For any complete set of allocations Ts ⊆ Ξh, if (x¯∗s, a¯∗s) ∈
arg maxTs∩Ξg(xs−1) Ws then (x¯
∗
t, a¯
∗
t) ∈ arg maxTt∩Ξg(x∗t−1)Wt for all t > s.
Time consistency in future choice is one necessary feature of a time-consistent subdo-
main. A second important requirement is that prior forward-looking constraints should
not be violated by alternative selections in the initial period s. Both of these requirements
are included in the following formal deﬁnition of time-consistent comparability.
Deﬁnition. The set of allocations Ts ⊂ Ξh is time-consistently comparable to the
allocation (x¯′s, a¯
′
s) iﬀ (x¯
′
s, a¯
′
s) ∈ Ts and:
1. Ts is complete, and
2. For all t ≥ s, r > 0 and (x¯t−1t−r , a¯t−1t−r) ∈ (X × A)r, if ((x¯t−1t−r , x¯′t) , (a¯t−1t−r , a¯′t)) ∈ Ξh
then
((
x¯t−1t−r , x¯
′′
t
)
,
(
a¯t−1t−r , a¯
′′
t
)) ∈ Ξh for all (x¯′′t , a¯′′t) ∈ Tt.
The second condition here states that if (x¯′t, a¯
′
t) could be consistent with a certain
sequence of outcomes prior to t, then any alternative continuation in Tt must also be
consistent with this sequence.
The most trivial example of a set Ts that is time-consistently comparable to (x¯′s, a¯′s)
is the singleton set containing (x¯′s, a¯
′
s) alone. Though not a particularly interesting case,
this conﬁrms the basic possibility of satisfying the deﬁnition.
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4.2.2 Imposing an ordering
By construction it is clear that if Ts is time-consistently comparable to the allocation
(x¯′s, a¯
′
s), there will be no time inconsistency problem associated with relative comparisons
between (x¯′s, a¯
′
s) and other members of Ts. Where there is no time inconsistency, we have
no reason to depart from standard choice principles. This motivates the following axiom:
Axiom 1. (Constraint dominance) Let Ts ⊆ Ξh be time-consistently comparable to
(x¯′s, a¯
′
s) ∈ Ξh. Then for all (x¯′′s , a¯′′s) ∈ Ts:
1. (x¯′′s , a¯
′′
s)  (x¯′s, a¯′s) implies (x¯′′s , a¯′′s) TC (x¯′s, a¯′s)
2. (x¯′′s , a¯
′′
s) ∼ (x¯′s, a¯′s) implies (x¯′′s , a¯′′s) ∼TC (x¯′s, a¯′s).
If (x¯′′s , a¯
′′
s) TC (x¯′s, a¯′s) holds by application of Axiom 1, we say that (x¯′′s , a¯′′s) constraint-
dominates (x¯′s, a¯
′
s).
Note that the converse (x¯′s, a¯
′
s)  (x¯′′s , a¯′′s) is not assumed to imply (x¯′s, a¯′s) TC
(x¯′′s , a¯
′′
s). The reason for this is that time-consistent comparability only ensures that
(x¯′′s , a¯
′′
s) is consistent with all past constraints that (x¯
′
s, a¯
′
s) satisﬁes, and not necessarily
vice-versa. A preference for (x¯′s, a¯
′
s) over (x¯
′′
s , a¯
′′
s) in period s may coincide with allocation
(x¯′′s , a¯
′′
s) delivering on a tougher set of past promises. If true, it may not be a time-
consistent ranking.
4.3 Axiom 2: Preference-based comparisons
The second axiom is based on preference rankings rather than constraint spaces. Within
the set of allocations Ξh, there will commonly exist pairs for which the within-period
ordering  is in agreement through time. A simple example would be any pair of constant
allocations in the inﬂation bias problem of Section 2. Whenever a subset of options has
this property, a conventional Pareto principle can justify TC coinciding with . The
second axiom formalises this.
4.3.1 Time-invariant feasibility
A Pareto principle can be applied whenever policy preferences between a pair of alloca-
tions, viewed in continuation, are unchanging through time. A complication in applying
this idea is that the comparative feasibility of the two alternatives may not be stable, due
to the evolution of state variables. For instance, in period s both (x¯′s, a¯
′
s) and (x¯
′′
s , a¯
′′
s)
may be feasible continuations, but in period t > s (x¯′′t , a¯
′′
t) may not be feasible, given x
′
t−1.
Depending on the model's structural constraints, this can occur whenever x′t−1 6= x′′t−1.
It makes the application of a Pareto criterion between the two sequences diﬃcult, be-
cause (x¯′t, a¯
′
t) and (x¯
′′
t , a¯
′′
t) can only be compared in period t under the assumption of
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a varying history. But the ordering  only describes preferences across continuations,
holding constant past outcomes.19 It does not necessarily provide a full description of
preferences across past decisions, and we do not want the Pareto criterion to be based on
an assumption that it does.
For this reason we restrict the deﬁnition of dominance to pairwise comparisons that
can be made without varying the sequence of state variables. Formally:
Deﬁnition. Allocations (x¯′s, a¯
′
s) and (x¯
′′
s , a¯
′′
s) in Ξ
h are preference-comparable in pe-
riod s if x¯′s = x¯
′′
s .
Since the feasibility of a sequence in s implies the feasibility of its continuation in
t > s, the following is immediate:
Remark. If (x¯′s, a¯
′
s) and (x¯
′′
s , a¯
′′
s) are preference-comparable and both belong to Ξ (xs−1)
for some xs−1, then both (x¯′t, a¯
′
t) and (x¯
′′
t , a¯
′′
t) belong to Ξ (xt−1) where xt−1 = x
′
t−1 = x
′′
t−1.
That is, the feasibility of a pair of preference-comparable allocations in s implies that
both remain feasible in t, under the assumption that one or other of these allocations was
pursued up to t− 1. Pairwise rankings across continuations will be well deﬁned in every
period, given that one or other option has been chosen to date. The Pareto principle will
thus be straightforward to apply.
4.3.2 Preference dominance deﬁned
The Pareto principle is asserted in its strong form, so that TC implies the strict ranking
 holds at all points in time. The example of Section 2 highlighted that weakening this
even at the limit as t→∞ could make time-consistent choice impossible.
A technical deﬁnition of strict preference that will endure in the limit can be achieved
by reference to lower contour sets. Let L (a¯s; x¯′s) := {a¯′s ∈ A : (x¯′s, a¯s)  (x¯′s, a¯′s)} be the
lower contour set for the allocation a¯s in A under the ordering , holding constant the
sequence of state vectors at x¯′s. If the norm on A is denoted by ‖·‖, then from the
deﬁnition of a lower contour set we have that (x¯′s, a¯
′
s)  (x¯′s, a¯′′s) applies if and only if
there exists an ε > 0 such that ‖(a¯′s − a¯s)‖ ≥ ε for all a¯s ∈ L (a¯′′s ; x¯′s). That is, a¯′s is
bounded away from the upper contour set of a¯′′s . This can be extended to ensure time-
invariant strict preference, including at the limit, by asserting that ε should be uniform
over time.
Formally, Axiom 2 on the ordering TC is the following:
Axiom 2. (Preference dominance) For any pair of preference-comparable allocations
(x¯′s, a¯
′
s) , (x¯
′
s, a¯
′′
s) ∈ Ξh:
19Equivalently, the social welfare functionWs that describes  should admit the addition of a separable
component that depends only on outcomes prior to s.
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1. If there exists an ε > 0 such that for all t ≥ s and all a¯t ∈ L (a¯′′t ; x¯′t), ‖(a¯′t − a¯t)‖ ≥
ε, then (x¯′s, a¯
′
s) TC (x¯′s, a¯′′s).
2. If (x¯′t, a¯
′
t) ∼ (x¯′t, a¯′′t) for all t ≥ s, then (x¯′s, a¯′s) ∼TC (x¯′s, a¯′′s).
If (x¯′s, a¯
′
s) TC (x¯′s, a¯′′s) holds by application of Condition 2, we say that (x¯′s, a¯′s)
preference-dominates (x¯′s, a¯
′′
s).
Condition 2 ensures that our solution concept will not select the Pareto-ineﬃcient
outcomes that can arise as equilibria under discretionary choice.
5 Choice
Orderings are precursors to choice. This section deﬁnes the link between the ordering
TC and a robust set of undominated policies in each period. The non-trivial aspect of
this is a requirement that chosen policies should be robust to the inclusion of additional
`irrelevant' (dominated) alternatives in the feasible set.
5.1 Irrelevant alternatives
The two axioms used to construct the orderingTC are quite restrictive in their applicabil-
ity. Axiom 1 only allows comparisons between time-consistently comparable allocations,
and Axiom 2 only allows comparisons between allocations that deliver identical paths
for the state vector through time. In some settings feasibility can severely restrict the
scope to make comparisons of this kind. In extreme cases it may be that the dominance
relation cannot be placed on any pairs in Ξ (xs−1). In these circumstances an expansion
of the feasible set could signiﬁcantly expand the set of dominance comparisons possible,
even when the new additions are themselves dominated under TC by other options in
Ξ (xs−1). This motivates incorporating an `independence of irrelevant alternatives' (IIA)
condition into choice.20
In our context an irrelevant choice is an allocation that is dominated under TC by a
feasible alternative. More generally, the following deﬁnition is used:
Deﬁnition. Fix any x′s−1 ∈ X. The set Ξ˜g
(
x′s−1
) ⊃ Ξg (x′s−1) is an irrelevant exten-
sion of Ξg
(
x′s−1
)
under TC if for every (x¯′s, a¯′s) ∈ Ξ˜g
(
x′s−1
)
that is not in Ξg
(
x′s−1
)
:
1. (x¯′s, a¯
′
s) ∈ Ξh; and
2. for all t ≥ s it is possible to ﬁnd an allocation (x¯′′t , a¯′′t) ∈ Ξg
(
x′t−1
) ∩ Ξh such that
(x¯′′t , a¯
′′
t) TC (x¯′t, a¯′t).
20Nash (1950) popularised this criterion. Sen (1970) I*6 contains a useful discussion of it, referring
to it as `property β'.
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Thus an irrelevant extension is an expansion of the feasible set such that every new
allocation is strictly dominated at every point in time by an allocation already in the
feasible set.
5.2 A robustly undominated set
To maximise generality we deﬁne an undominated set by reference to the largest possible
irrelevant extension. Thus denote by Ξˆg (xs−1) the union of all irrelevant extensions of
Ξg (xs−1) under TC , and let Ξˆ (xs−1) := Ξˆg (xs−1) ∩ Ξh. It is immediate that Ξˆg (xs−1)
is the largest possible irrelevant extension of Ξg (xs−1) under TC . The undominated
set, D (xs−1), is then deﬁned by:
Deﬁnition.
D (xs−1) =
{
(x¯s, a¯s) ∈ Ξ (xs−1) : ¬
[
∃ (x¯′s, a¯′s) ∈ Ξˆ (xs−1) : (x¯′s, a¯′s) TC (x¯s, a¯s)
]}
In words, D (xs−1) is the set of allocations that is undominated under TC in every
possible irrelevant extension of the constraint set.
6 A two-part problem
This section shows how undominated choices can be analysed via a two-step decompo-
sition of choice into `inner' and `outer' problems. The inner problem is concerned with
choice for a given sequence of promises. The outer problem is concerned with the choice
of these promises.
6.1 An inner problem: choice given promises
The decomposition makes extensive use of promise values. For any allocation (x¯′s, a¯
′
s) ∈
X × A, we will say that this allocation induces the sequence of promise values
ω¯′s ∈ W , deﬁned elementwise for all σt−1 ∈ Σ and all t ≥ s by:
ω′t (σt−1) := Et−1
[ ∞∑
τ=t
βτ−th (a′τ (στ ) , στ )
∣∣∣∣∣σt−1
]
(7)
The spaceW to which ω¯′s belongs is taken to be a Banach space with norm ‖·‖. Each
ωt (σ) is deﬁned up to a set of transformations consistent with the deﬁnition of h,
21 and
so W is likewise.
21That is, if h is diﬀerence-comparable, ωt (σ) is deﬁned up to the class of aﬃne transforms with
common slope parameter across σ and t, and if h is ratio-comparable, ωt (σ) is deﬁned up to a scalar
multiple (that may vary in σ and t).
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Promises play a useful role because they characterise time-consistently comparable
sets. Formally:
Proposition 3. Consider an allocation (x¯′s, a¯
′
s) ∈ Ξh, inducing promises ω¯′s. A complete
set Ts is time-consistently comparable to (x¯′s, a¯′s) if for all (x¯′′s , a¯′′s) ∈ Ts the following
conditions hold for all σ ∈ Σ:
h (a′′t (σ) , σ) + βω
′
t+1 (σ) ≥ h0 (a′′t (σ) , σ) (8)
Et−1
[
h (a′′t (σ
′) , σ′) + βω′t+1 (σ
′)
∣∣σ] ≥ ω′t (σ) (9)
When Assumption 2 holds, Ts is time-consistently comparable to (x¯′s, a¯′s) only if condi-
tions (8) and (9) hold for all (x¯′′s , a¯
′′
s) ∈ Ts and all σ ∈ Σ.
Assumption 2 is relatively strong, but its role here is mainly to simplify the statement.
It could be dispensed with in the `only if' part, but with signiﬁcant notational cost.
Condition (8) will be referred to in what follows as a `promise-making constraint', and
(9) as a `promise-keeping constraint'.22
Given Axiom 1, the following problem then becomes central to the analysis:
Problem 1. (Inner Problem)
sup
(x¯s,a¯s)∈Ξg(xs−1)
Ws
subject to (8) and (9) for all t ≥ s and all σ ∈ Σ, given ω¯′s ∈ W and xs−1 ∈ X.
The main interest in this problem comes from the following:
Proposition 4. 1. For any xs−1 ∈ X, each allocation in the undominated set D (xs−1)
solves Problem 1 for the promise values that it induces.
2. Let Assumption 2 hold, and suppose the allocation (x¯′s, a¯
′
s) solves Problem 1 for the
promise values that it induces, given xs−1 ∈ X. Then no allocation in Ξ (xs−1)
constraint-dominates (x¯′s, a¯
′
s).
Thus the Proposition provides conditions under which `undominated under Axiom 1'
and `solving Problem 1' are equivalent requirements. For practical purposes part 2 will be
more useful than part 1. With enough regularity it is straightforward to ﬁnd conditions
such that allocations solve Problem 1 for the promise values that they induce.
Problem 1 is referred to in what follows as the inner problem. By design, it is
entirely time-consistent. The outer problem is the problem of choosing a sequence of
promise values, ω¯s.
22Following Abreu, Pearce and Stachetti (1990), it is well known that augmenting the policy design
problem with promise-keeping constraints, and treating promises as additional states, allows the Ramsey
solution to be recovered using conventional dynamic programming techniques.
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6.2 An outer problem: undominated promises
6.2.1 The value function and its derivative
The value of the inner problem can be denoted V (ω¯s;xs−1), and this function is a useful
reference point for analysing the outer choice of promises ω¯s. It is deﬁned for all ω¯s ∈ W
such that the constraint set for Problem 1 is non-empty, given xs−1. This set is denoted
Ω (xs−1) ⊆ W , and its interior Ω˚ (xs−1). Appendix B establishes conditions for V and Ω
to exhibit important regularity properties, notably concavity of V in the promises and
convexity of Ω. Assumption 5 is critical to this; it will be harder to treat cases where
concavity in h and r and/or convexity in h0 fail. The appendix also characterises the
derivative of V with respect to the promises, where this exists. In general this is given
by:
δV (ω¯s, xs−1; w¯s) =
∞∑
t=s
βt−s
ˆ
σ∈Σ
{
β
[
λmt (σ) + λ
k
t (σ−)
]
wt+1 (σ)− λkt (σ)wt (σ)
}
dΠ (σ)
(10)
where w¯s is a vector movement away from ω¯s, required to have the property that
(ω¯s + αw¯s) ∈ Ω (xs−1) for all α in a suﬃciently small neighbourhood of zero. λmt (σ)
and λkt (σ) are Lagrange multipliers on (8) and (9) respectively in Problem 1, and σ− is
the predecessor history to σ.
Condition (10) is a standard envelope result, stated for arbitrary derivative vectors.
Intuitively, an increase in ωt+1 (σ) relaxes the promise-making and promise-keeping con-
straints in t associated with this history. This accounts for the term β
[
λmt (σ) + λ
k
t (σ−)
]
.23
Against this, an increase in ωt (σ) tightens the promise-keeping restriction in period t.
This accounts for the term λkt (σ).
The multipliers λmt (σ) and λ
k
t (σ) are important objects in the literature on Kydland
and Prescott problems, as highlighted by Marcet and Marimon (1998, 2017). The con-
trast between our policy recommendations and conventional Ramsey policy is easiest to
understand by reference to these objects, and we make extensive use of them below.
6.2.2 Preferences across promises
V (ω¯s;xs−1) describes a preference ordering over the space Ω (xs−1), particular to the
policymaker in period s. This ordering can be denoted ωxs−1 :
ω¯′s ωxs−1 ω¯′′s ←→ V (ω¯′s;xs−1) ≥ V (ω¯′′s ;xs−1)
The next Proposition shows that policies that are undominated according to TC in
allocation space are also undominated in promise space according to a Pareto criterion
23Recall that ωt+1 (σ) enters into the promise-keeping constraint (9) for the predecessor state σ− in t,
whereas it enters the promise-making constraint (8) for σ itself.
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based on ωxs−1 . To formalise this, a lower contour set Lω is deﬁned in promise space as
follows:
Lω (ω¯′s;xs−1) :=
{
ω¯s ∈ W : ω¯s ωxs−1 ω¯′s
}
A Pareto criterion based on ωxs−1 that mirrors Axiom 2 can be deﬁned on the space of
promises as follows:
Deﬁnition. Consider the promise sequence ω¯′s such that (x¯
′
s, a¯
′
s) solves Problem 1 for ω¯
′
s,
given some initial x′s−1. ω¯
′
s is dominated by ω¯
′′
s if and only if there exists an ε > 0 such
that for all t ≥ s, ‖ω¯′′t − ω¯t‖ ≥ ε for all ω¯t ∈ Lω
(
ω¯′t;x
′
t−1
)
.
A promise sequence ω¯′′s dominates ω¯
′
s if at every t ≥ s, the policymaker would rather
switch from ω¯′t to ω¯
′′
t . Note that for this deﬁnition, the state x
′
t−1 is the one induced by
ω¯′s.
The interest in this derives from the following Proposition:
Proposition 5. Suppose (x¯′s, a¯
′
s) solves Problem 1 for the promise sequence that it in-
duces, ω¯′s, given some initial xs−1. Then (x¯
′
s, a¯
′
s) belongs to D (xs−1) if and only if ω¯
′
s is
not dominated by any alternative promise sequence.
Thus ﬁnding an undominated allocation is equivalent to ﬁnding an undominated
promise sequence for the outer problem. Undominated promise sequences are relatively
easy to identify, and can be characterised directly in terms of the multipliers λmt (σ) and
λkt (σ).
7 Characterisation results
This section derives necessary and suﬃcient properties for policies that inhabit the set
D (xt−1) in all time periods. These `time-consistently undominated policies' are the
main focus of our paper. The emphasis is on theoretical results that have the greatest
generality possible. Section 8 translates these into a more practical method for deriving
time-consistently undominated policy, and Section 9 presents direct applications.
7.1 Ramsey policy
We start by recasting the Ramsey problem in terms of the apparatus presented in Section
6. If this problem is posed in period s, then for an initial state vector xs−1 it solves:
max
ω¯s∈Ω(xs−1)
V (ω¯s;xs−1)
Consistent with this, and making use of equation (10) above, Ramsey policy will generally
require:
λkt (σ) = λ
m
t−1 (σ) + λ
k
t−1 (σ−) (11)
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for Π-almost all σ ∈ Σ, t > s, and:
λks (σ) = 0 (12)
for Π-almost all σ ∈ Σ. Conditions (11) and (12) are familiar from Marcet and Marimon
(1998, 2017). The time inconsistency of the solution is immediate from the diﬀerence
between (11) and (12).
An important consideration for the current paper is whether, despite its time inconsis-
tency, the Ramsey policy at least remains undominated as time progresses, in the sense
set out above. It turns out that it does not, at least in environments where the time
inconsistency problem prevails indeﬁnitely. Formally:
Proposition 6. Let (x¯′s, a¯
′
s) solve the Ramsey problem for period s, such that for all
t > s, λkt (σ) is bounded above zero for all σ in a positive-measure subset of Σ. Then for
all t > s, (x¯′t, a¯
′
t) /∈ D
(
x′t−1
)
.
So long as λkt (σ) remains bounded above zero, time inconsistency remains. In these
circumstances, each period's policymaker from s + 1 on would accept future promises
being less demanding, if inherited promise-keeping constraints were relaxed in return.
This delivers a strict improvement in every period, so long as promise-keeping constraints
continue to bind indeﬁnitely along the Ramsey path.
7.2 Time-consistently undominated policy: necessity
This subsection provides necessary restrictions on policies that remain in D (xs−1) indef-
initely. In all cases the Propositions are stated in a way that is independent of equivalent
representations of the h function  and hence of promises. This implies slightly diﬀerent
statements depending on whether diﬀerence comparability or ratio comparability obtains,
and the Propositions allow for this. The essential arguments are identical regardless of
the form of comparability.
7.2.1 Long-run dynamics
The ﬁrst result relates to the long-run evolution of promise multipliers.
Proposition 7. Suppose that the policy (x¯′s, a¯
′
s) is time-consistently undominated, given
some initial x′s−1, and that V is diﬀerentiable at the induced promise sequence ω¯
′
s. If h is
diﬀerence-comparable then for Π-almost all σ ∈ Σ, either:
1. There is no period τ such that both
[
λmt (σ) + λ
k
t (σ−)
]
and λkt (σ) are bounded above
zero for all t ≥ τ .
or :
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2. For all ρ ∈ (0, 1) and all positive scalars K1 and K2, it is possible to ﬁnd a τ ≥ s
and T > τ such that:
K1ρ
r−τ <
r−1∏
t=τ
λkt (σ)
β
[
λmt (σ) + λ
k
t (σ−)
] < K2(1
ρ
)r−τ
for all r ≥ T .
Identical conditions apply when h is ratio-comparable, except that the multiplier objects
in part 1 are replaced by
[
λmt (σ) + λ
k
t (σ−)
]
ωt+1 (σ) and λ
k
t (σ)ωt (σ) respectively, and the
ratio in part 2 is replaced by:∣∣∣∣ωτ (σ)ωr (σ)
∣∣∣∣ r−1∏
t=τ
λkt (σ)
β
[
λmt (σ) + λ
k
t (σ−)
]
We focus ﬁrst on the diﬀerence-comparable case. Here the Proposition should be read
as a statement about the long-run tendency of the ratio
λkt (σ)
β[λmt (σ)+λkt (σ−)]
. So long as this
ratio exists and is bounded above zero in the long run (part 1 of the Proposition), its
compounded product from τ onwards must be stable relative to any non-trivial geometric
process. The requirement that both
[
λmt (σ) + λ
k
t (σ−)
]
and λkt (σ) are bounded above zero
for suﬃciently large t reﬂects a need that promises should not come to be irrelevant to
the allocation as time progresses. If the multiplier terms were to converge to zero, the
scope to improve welfare by changing promises would clearly be limited. The change to
Proposition 7 when the h functions are ratio comparable merely ensures invariance to a
change over time to the units in which ωt (σ
′) is expressed.
In the event that convergence in the multipliers occurs, a far sharper statement is
possible:
Corollary 1. Suppose that the policy sequence (x¯′s, a¯
′
s) is time-consistently undominated,
and induces multipliers λkt (σ) and λ
m
t (σ) that converge to bounded steady-state values
λkss (σ) and λ
m
ss (σ) for all σ ∈ Σ. Then under diﬀerence-comparability:
β
[
λmss (σ) + λ
k
ss (σ−)
]
= λkss (σ) (13)
Under ratio comparability the same applies, provided there is additionally conver-
gence in the promise values  something that can always be guaranteed by normalisation.
Thus when convergence is assured, time-consistently undominated policy mandates a very
simple equality restriction for the promise multipliers, at least in steady state. Again,
the contrast with Ramsey policy is worth emphasising. By equation (11), it is immediate
that if Ramsey policy converges to a steady state with bounded multipliers, these will
satisfy the relationship:
λmss (σ) + λ
k
ss (σ−) = λ
k
ss (σ)
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This is inconsistent with (13) whenever the multipliers are non-zero and β < 1.
7.2.2 Averaging policy preferences over time
Proposition 7 does not place any direct restriction either on the evolution of the promise
multipliers from one period to the next, nor on outcomes across diﬀerent states σ. The
next Proposition shows that time-consistently undominated policies must also satisfy
restrictions along both these dimensions, for `almost all' time periods. The latter concept
uses the following:
Deﬁnition. Consider an arbitrary vector of variables zt ∈ Rn and an arbitrary function
φ : Z → R. For any time period τ and any ε > 0, index by i ∈ {1, ..., N} the set of
periods t in which |φ (zt)| ≥ ε, with t (i, τ, ε) used to denote the time period in which the
ith occurrence of this inequality arises subsequent to τ . We will say that the restriction
φ (zt) = 0 is almost always true if for all ε > 0 and all τ , either N is ﬁnite or:
sup
i
[t (i+ 1, τ, ε)− t (i, τ, ε)] =∞
We have the following:
Proposition 8. Suppose that the policy (x¯′s, a¯
′
s) is time-consistently undominated, given
some initial x′s−1 ∈ X. Then there exists a sequence of scalar values {αt}t≥s with αt ∈
(0, 1] for all t ≥ s, such that for Π-almost all σ ∈ Σ, under diﬀerence comparability
the following equality is almost always true:
αt
[
λmt (σ) + λ
k
t (σ−)
]− λkt+1 (σ) = 0 (14)
and under ratio comparability this becomes:24
αt
[
λmt (σ) + λ
k
t (σ−)
]
ωt+1 (σ)− λkt+1 (σ)ωt+1 (σ) = 0 (15)
Note that the Ramsey optimality conditions (11) and (12) are special cases of (14)
with αt = 1 and αt = 0 respectively. The Proposition thus states that time-consistently
undominated choice for t + 1 is a weighted average of two extremes: what a prior pol-
icymaker, in t or earlier, would like, and what a policymaker in t + 1 would like. The
relative weight, αt, is identical across states σ, though it can vary through time.
25 In
this regard time-consistently undominated policy strikes a balance between the interests
of prior and contemporaneous policymakers.
24The ωt+1 (σ) in this equation does not cancel, because the deﬁnition of `almost always true' is
scale-dependent.
25It follows from (13) that αt = β in steady state, if one is reached. But the Proposition does require
convergence.
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The fact that αt > 0 in Proposition 8 is particularly signiﬁcant, for two reasons. First,
it demonstrates that a Markov discretionary approach to policy design is dominated under
the ordering TC , except in trivial cases. Markov policy sets λkt (σ) = 0 for all t and all σ.
So long as shadow beneﬁts to making promises endure over time, i.e. λmt (σ) > 0 remains
true, this is not compatible with time-consistently undominated choice.
The second implication of αt > 0 relates back to Proposition 5, which established the
link between undominated policies and undominated promise sequences. This link was
qualiﬁed by the requirement that an undominated policy should solve the inner problem
for the promise sequence that it induces. This is guaranteed only if the promise-keeping
constraint is always binding. The Proposition demonstrates that a binding promise-
keeping constraint is a generic feature of time-consistently undominated policy, again so
long as the beneﬁts from making promises remain positive.
7.3 Time-consistently undominated policy: suﬃciency
Propositions 7 and 8 help eliminate important options, notably Markov and Ramsey pol-
icy, but for more constructive purposes we need suﬃciency results. This section provides
general conditions that guarantee that a policy never comes to be dominated.
Proposition 9. Consider a policy (x¯′s, a¯
′
s) that solves Problem 1 for the promise sequence
that it induces, ω¯′s. The continuation of this policy (x¯
′
t, a¯
′
t) will belong to D
(
x′t−1
)
for all
t ≥ s provided the following are true:
1. The value function V (ω¯s;xs−1) is concave in ω¯s.
2. (a) There exist positive scalars K and K¯ such that for all τ ≥ s, r > τ and σ ∈ Σ,
under diﬀerence comparability:
K ≤
r−1∏
t=τ
λkt (σ)
β
[
λmt (σ) + λ
k
t (σ−)
] ≤ K¯ (16)
or, under ratio comparability:
K ≤
∣∣∣∣ωτ (σ)ωr (σ)
∣∣∣∣ r−1∏
t=τ
λkt (σ)
β
[
λmt (σ) + λ
k
t (σ−)
] ≤ K¯ (17)
(b) There is a sequence of scalars {αt}∞t=s, with αt ∈ [α, α¯] for all t and 0 < α ≤
α¯ < 1, such that λmt (σ), λ
k
t (σ−) and λ
k
t+1 (σ) converge across σ ∈ Σ as follows:
lim
t→∞
[
λkt+1 (σ)
αt
[
λmt (σ) + λ
k
t (σ−)
]] = 1 (18)
where the rate of convergence is at least linear.
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In conventional optimisation problems it is standard for suﬃciency conditions to be
limited to environments with concave objectives, and part 1 of this Proposition is required
for identical reasons. Without it, it would not be possible to reason from local derivative
restrictions to a global statement. Conditions for a concave value function are provided
in Appendix B.
The second part of the Proposition provides restrictions on the multipliers that are
slightly tighter that the necessary restrictions provided in Propositions 7 and 8. A policy
is time-consistently undominated provided the compounded ratio of promise multipliers in
(16) remains bounded, and provided its multipliers from one period to the next converge
to satisfying a common ratio αt across states  where αt may be time varying, and is only
restricted to lie in some closed range between 0 and 1.
The freedom in αt permitted under Proposition 9 indicates that it will usually be
possible to ﬁnd many dynamic policies that are time-consistently undominated. This
was already demonstrated informally in the inﬂation bias example of Section 2, with
Figure 2 illustrating three alternatives. As the next Section illustrates, an alternative
representation of the problem provides an appealing route to resolving this issue.
8 Time consistently undominated policy as a time-consistent
optimum
In this section we show that time-consistently undominated policies have a parallel in-
terpretation as the time-consistent solution to a restricted optimisation problem. This
is central in allowing our approach to be operationalised, and to select a uniqe policy
among the mutliple time-consistently undominated options.
8.1 A restricted-dimension problem
8.1.1 One-dimensional promise choice
We will consider the problem of choosing a promise sequence ω¯s from some restricted-
dimensional subspace ofW , where this subspace is deﬁned parametrically by reference to
a benchmark sequence ω¯′s ∈ Ω˚ (xs−1) and a set of possible vector movements away from
ω¯′s. In order for the analysis to be independent of arbitrary renormalisations, the available
vector movements will be deﬁned in a way that is invariant to permissable rescalings of
the promise values. Once more, this requires the cases of diﬀerence comparability and
ratio comparability to be treated distinctly.
Irrespective of the form of comparability, we will deﬁne δ¯s as an array of `slope pa-
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rameters' δt (σ), with δt (σ) ∈
[
δ, δ¯
]
for all t and σ, and 0 < δ ≤ δ¯ <∞:
δ¯s :=
{{δt (σ)}σ∈Σ}t≥s
θ will denote an array of choice variables θ (σ) ∈ R, independent of time:
θ := {θ (σ)}σ∈Σ
Notation is simpliﬁed by writing θδ¯s to denote the array obtained by elementwise multi-
plication:
θδ¯s :=
{{θ (σ) δt (σ)}σ∈Σ}t≥s
and exp
{
θδ¯s
}
to denote the array:
exp
{
θδ¯s
}
:=
{{exp {θ (σ) δt (σ)}}σ∈Σ}t≥s
The realised promise choice ω¯s will depend on the chosen value of θ, given δ¯s and ω¯
′
s.
It is written as ω¯s
(
θ; ω¯′s, δ¯s
)
:
ω¯s
(
θ; ω¯′s, δ¯s
)
:=
ω¯′s+θδ¯s (diﬀerence comparability)ω′s exp{θδ¯s} (ratio comparability)
Note that in both of these expressions, varying θ (σ) allows σ-contingent promises to be
changed along exactly one dimension for all time periods. A straightforward example of
restricted-dimensional choice was seen in the example of Section 2, when studying the
set of constant inﬂation-output combinations.
8.1.2 Problem
We will consider the following problem:
Problem 2. (Restricted Promise Choice)
sup
θ∈RΣ
V
(
ω¯s
(
θ; ω¯′s, δ¯s
)
;xs−1
)
given ω¯′s and δ¯s.
Assuming that it exists, the value of θ that solves this problem is denoted θ∗, with
the resulting promise vector ω¯∗s := ω¯s
(
θ∗; ω¯′s, δ¯s
)
, which is assumed to induce endogenous
state vector x∗t in period t ≥ s.
Suppose that the solution to Problem 2 induces a promise sequence that belongs
to Ω˚ (xs−1), the interior of Ω (xs−1). Then by standard calculus a necessary optimality
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condition for Π-almost all σ is:
∞∑
r=s
βr−s
{
λkr (σ) δr (σ)− β
[
λmr (σ) + λ
k
r (σ−)
]
δr+1 (σ)
}
= 0 (19)
for the case of diﬀerence comparability and:
∞∑
r=s
βr−s
{
λkr (σ)ωr (σ) δr (σ)− β
[
λmr (σ) + λ
k
r (σ−)
]
ωr+1 (σ) δr+1 (σ)
}
= 0 (20)
for the case of ratio comparability. If the value function is concave in ω¯s then these
conditions are also suﬃcient.
8.1.3 Time-consistent choice
Problem 2 is time-consistent if the optimal choice θ∗ remains the same through time.
This is the case of interest. If true, (19) or (20) must hold for all possible s, not just as
a one-oﬀ. This means that the forward sum will cancel, leaving a single within-period
restriction that must hold for all t ≥ s:
λkt (σ) δt (σ)− β
[
λmt (σ) + λ
k
t (σ−)
]
δt+1 (σ) = 0 (21)
under diﬀerence comparability or:
λkt (σ)ωt (σ) δt (σ)− β
[
λmt (σ) + λ
k
t (σ−)
]
ωt+1 (σ) δt+1 (σ) = 0 (22)
with ratio comparability.
Conditions (21) and (22) are within-period cross-restrictions on the multipliers for the
promise-keeping and promise-making constraints. By contrast with Ramsey policy, the
restriction in the dimensionality of the policy instrument θ is oﬀset by the requirement
for choice to be optimal in every period, so that a single multiplier restriction for each
period still obtains. Promises are chosen optimally for every period along one dimension,
rather than being optimal for one period in every dimension.
Suppose that ω¯s indeed satisﬁes these conditions for all t. Then consider the following
product ratio under diﬀerence comparability:
r−1∏
t=s
λkt (σ)
β
[
λmt (σ) + λ
k
t (σ−)
] = δr (σ)
δs (σ)
The boundedness restrictions on δr (σ) and δs (σ) imply that the object on the left-hand
side here must be bounded uniformly above 0 and below ∞ in r. Thus ω¯∗s will satisfy
suﬃciency condition 2(a) in Proposition 9, at least for this value of σ. A similar argument
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applies under ratio comparability. Summarising as a Proposition:
Proposition 10. Suppose the value function V (ω¯s;xs−1) is concave in ω¯s. Then an
allocation (x¯∗s, a¯
∗
s), inducing promises ω¯
∗
s ∈ Ω˚ (xs−1), satisﬁes suﬃciency condition 2(a)
of Proposition 9 if and only if there is a bounded sequence δ¯s such that ω¯
∗
s solves Problem
2 recursively, given δ¯s and ω¯
′
s = ω¯
∗
s .
This follows from the foregoing discussion, and a formal proof is omitted.
The Proposition does not directly establish that recursive solutions to Problem 2 are
time-consistently undominated, as condition 2(a) of Proposition 9 is not enough for this
in isolation. The following corollary has more practical applicability for this purpose:
Corollary 2. Suppose the value function V (ω¯s;xs−1) is concave in ω¯s, and that diﬀer-
ence comparability applies. If an allocation (x¯∗s, a¯
∗
s), inducing promises ω¯
∗
s , solves Problem
2 recursively, given ω¯′s = ω¯
∗
s and some δ¯s, and induces convergence in the intertemporal
multipliers to steady-state values λmss (σ) > 0 and λ
k
ss (σ) > 0 for Π-almost all σ ∈ Σ, then
(x¯∗s, a¯
∗
s) is time-consistently undominated. The same result applies under ratio compara-
bility if in addition the promises ω∗t (σ) converge to steady-state values ω
∗
ss (σ) 6= 0 for
Π-almost all σ ∈ Σ.
Steady-state convergence is not a necessary property for a time-consistently undom-
inated policy, but it is extremely simple to verify when it does arise. Indeed, the most
straightforward computational approach to solving for a time-consistently undominated
policy will be ﬁrst to solve for a steady-state allocation, and then to compute convergence
to it. This imposes the convergence property directly.
8.2 Symmetry
The unresolved multiplicity in the set of time-consistently undominated policies, ﬁrst seen
in the example of Section 2, is reﬂected in the number of free parameters that Problem
2 leaves open. Both the `intercept' ω¯′s and `slope' δ¯s are presently indeterminate. The
multiplier restriction (21) or (22) will place one cross restriction on these two choices, but
this still leaves one degree of freedom for each date-state.
The example of Section 2 also indicated that a symmetry reﬁnement might resolve this
issue. Time-consistent selection from the (restricted-dimensional) set of constant policies
 an identical problem in each period  delivered the most appealing choice.
More generally, a well-deﬁned version of symmetry is to require that whatever ver-
sion of Problem 2 recovers the chosen policy, this problem should give each period's
policymaker exactly the same control over promises through time. The key step in the
argument is that `identical promise control' must be deﬁned in a way that is invariant to
admissible renormalisations. This invariance consideration is what ensures uniqueness.
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In both of the two comparability cases, it leaves just one possibility for symmetry to have
meaning.
Consider ﬁrst a case of diﬀerence comparability. This means that level changes in the
promises are deﬁned relative to one another, whilst the absolute values of the promises
are not. In this case a symmetric version of Problem 2 would require that δs (σ) = δt (σ)
for all t > s and all σ ∈ Σ. A necessary optimality condition from the resulting time-
consistent problem in period t is:
λkt (σ)− β
[
λmt (σ) + λ
k
t (σ−)
]
= 0 (23)
Equivalently, if ratio comparability holds then proportional changes in the promises
are all that is deﬁned. A symmetric version of Problem 2 would again require that
δs (σ) = δt (σ) for all t > s and all σ ∈ Σ, noting that δt (σ) is the per-unit proportional
change to ωt (σ) in this case. The following restriction results for all t and σ:
λkt (σ)ωt (σ)− β
[
λmt (σ) + λ
k
t (σ−)
]
ωt+1 (σ) = 0 (24)
Since a symmetric solution imposes the same multiplier restriction each period, it is
consistent with a steady state being achieved. Thus suﬃciency can be conﬁrmed easily
via Corollary 2.
9 Applications
We apply our method to three textbook time-inconsistency problems. These are, ﬁrst,
a capital tax problem in the style of Judd (1985); second, a social insurance problem
subject to one-sided limited commitment constraints; and third, a dynamic moral hazard
problem in the style of Atkeson and Lucas (1992). Analytical workings are relegated to
Appendix D.
9.1 Capital taxation
We consider a variant of the optimal capital tax problem due to Judd (1985), with a
balanced budget restriction on government policy.26 This problem has recently received
renewed attention through the work of Straub and Werning (2015), who showed that the
Ramsey plan may not deliver zero long-run capital taxes, contrary to widespread prior
understanding.
26This restriction ensures a forward-looking implementability constraint that must apply in every
period, matching our general constraint (5).
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9.1.1 Setup
There are two types of agent in equal measure: a worker who supplies labour inelas-
tically and has no access to savings instruments, and a capitalist who does not work.
The government's preferences are described by a weighted sum of these agents' lifetime
utilities:
Ws :=
∞∑
t=s
βt−s
[
u (cwt ) + µu
(
ckt
)]
(25)
where cwt is consumption of the worker in period t, c
k
t is consumption of the capitalist,
and µ ≥ 0 is the relative Pareto weight on capitalists' welfare.
The period-by-period resource constraint is given by:
cwt + c
k
t + gt + kt ≤ f (kt−1) + (1− δ) kt−1 (26)
where kt−1 is capital inherited in period t, gt is an exogenous level of government spending,
and the production function f takes as implicit the ﬁxed level of labour supply.27 The
government taxes net capital income linearly, with the tax rate denoted τ kt . The resulting
funds are used to ﬁnance government spending and lump-sum transfers to workers, Tt.
Since it must run a balanced budget period-by-period, the government's choices must
satisfy:
(rt − δ) τ kt kt−1 ≥ gt + Tt (27)
where rt is the rental cost of capital. As is well known,
28 this condition can be replaced
by an implementability constraint, expressed purely in terms of allocations. We write
this in a form consistent with (5) above:
uck,s
(
cks + ks
) ≤ ∞∑
t=s
βt−suck,tc
k
t (28)
where subscripts denote derivatives in the usual way. Thus the function h0 here corre-
sponds to uck,s
(
cks + ks
)
, and h corresponds to uck,tc
k
t .
29 Notice that in general this may
not be consistent with concavity in h or convexity in h0. This means that the value
function will not be guaranteed to be concave.30 We will be able to derive necessary
conditions for an optimum, but suﬃciency is not guaranteed. As noted by Lucas and
Stokey (1983), this problem is shared by conventional Ramsey analysis in the dynamic
tax literature. It is not a speciﬁc problem with our approach.
27There are the usual constant returns in capital and labour jointly.
28See, for instance, Chari and Kehoe (1999).
29Since ks is a state variable, strictly it should not be included in the deﬁnition of h0. Deﬁning an
auxiliary variable k˜s together with the additional restriction k˜s = ks would allow direct consistency with
the general presentation.
30See Appendix B.
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Condition (28) can be interpreted as an oﬀer curve for the capitalist in each period,
given that the value of private savings must equal the value of future capital. The object
uck,tc
k
t corresponds to the value of the capitalist's consumption in period 0. Proportional
changes to this have meaning independent of normalisations to the price level, whereas
level changes do not. Hence the h function is assumed to exhibit ratio comparability.
9.1.2 Time-consistently undominated policy
In Appendix D.1 we show that a symmetric time-consistently undominated policy can be
characterised in every period by the single condition:
kt {βηt+1 [1 + fk,t+1 − δ]− ηt} = ckt
{
ηt − µuck,t
}
(29)
where ηt is the Lagrange multiplier on the resource constraint (26) in period t. Together
with (26), (28), and a simple ﬁrst-order condition with respect to cwt (equation (73) in
the Appendix), this is suﬃcient to close the model.
Condition (29) provides an intuitive statement of the trade-oﬀ that our policy strikes.
The objects in curly brackets can be read as `wedges' relative to a ﬁrst-best choice. On
the left-hand side is the capital wedge, multiplied by the quantity of capital invested
in period t. On the right-hand side is the wedge between the shadow cost of resources
and the marginal social value of giving income to the capitalist in period t, multiplied
by the value of the capitalist's consumption. Intuitively, providing more spending power
to the capitalist is desirable to the extent that it boosts savings, and hence reduces the
capital wedge. It is undesirable to the extent that it provides resources to an agent
whose consumption exceeds the socially desirable level. Condition (29) balances these
two concerns.
A Ramsey policy would also incorporate these considerations, but is complicated by
an additional desire to tailor intertemporal consumption prices  proportional to uck,t 
in a way that will be most beneﬁcial from the perspective of period 0. In most cases this
gives it an extra degree of dynamic complexity by comparison. Lansing (1999), however,
highlighted that the Ramsey problem is substantially simpliﬁed when the consumption
utility of capitalists is logarithmic. In this case the implementability condition reduces
to:
ks
cs
≤ β
1− β
This is a static restriction, and so the problem is not subject to any time inconsistency
problem. This suggests that time-consistently undominated policy should coincide with
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Figure 3: Capital tax dynamics: time-consistently undominated policy
Ramsey choice for this case. Indeed, Ramsey policy is easily shown to require:31
kt {βηt+1 [1 + fk,t+1 − δ]− ηt} = ckt
{
ηt − µ
(
ckt
)−1}
(30)
The comparison with (29) conﬁrms that time-consistently undominated policy coincides
with Ramsey policy when time inconsistency is absent.
Lansing (1999) shows that (30) is consistent with positive long-run capital taxes when
µ is set suﬃciently low. Straub and Werning (2015) showed that positive long-run capital
taxes are a general feature of the problem whenever σ ≥ 1 holds and µ is suﬃciently small,
with σ = 1 a threshold case. Our approach provides an alternative generalisation of the
σ = 1 result. It also implies positive long-run capital taxes for small enough µ, but 
unlike the Ramsey solutions that Straub and Werning highlight  the simpler dynamics
in the promise multipliers relative to the Ramsey case prevent convergence to corner
solutions.
Figure 3 illustrates this. It charts the evolution of capital taxes and the capital stock
over time, for diﬀerent values of the initial capital stock, given σ = 2.32 All variables
remain in steady state, conditional on starting there. When the capital stock starts above
steady state, capital taxes start above their steady-state values, and likewise taxes are low
when the capital stock starts low. Capital income taxes take high values by comparison
with conventional results  in the region of 50 per cent. This reﬂects the fact that the
calibration puts zero welfare weight on the capitalist.
31This follows from conditions (74) and (75) in Appendix D.1.
32We assume µ = 0. The production function is Cobb-Douglas with capital share of 0.33, and we set
β = 0.96, δ = 0.05 and gt = 0.4 for all t. The latter corresponds to steady-state government spending of
around 25 percent of GDP.
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9.2 Limited commitment
We consider a one-sided limited commitment model without savings, in which a contin-
uum of agents receives a stochastic income draw each period. The utilitarian government
provides social insurance, subject to a participation constraint.
9.2.1 Setup
Measure µ ∈ [0, 1) of the agents are guaranteed to receive a low income yl in every period,
whilst the remaining (1− µ) each period receive a high income yh > yl with probability
p, and yl with probability (1− p). The income draws are iid across agents and time,
and publicly observable. A utilitarian government seeks to smooth consumption across
indivduals, subject to ensuring that all individuals are at least as well oﬀ as under autarky.
In principle the policymaker has complete information about the entire history of
income draws for each agent. However, a suﬃcient statistic for computing both Ramsey
and time-consistently undominated policy is the number of periods elapsed since an agent
last received the high income draw, yh. Thus we let the exogenous stochastic variable
σ ∈ Σ be deﬁned as the number of periods since a given agent last drew yh, with Σ :=
(N ∪∞).33 The Markov process governing σ for agents with stochastic incomes is thus:
σ′ =
σ + 1 with prob (1− p)0 with prob p
Agents with a ﬁxed, low income have σ =∞ in all periods.
Given the process determining σ, the utilitarian policymaker ranks continuation allo-
cations from period s onwards according to:
Ws :=
∞∑
t=s
βt−s
[
(1− µ)
∞∑
σ=0
(1− p)σ pu (ct (σ)) + µu(ct (∞))
]
(31)
There is no saving, so the aggregate resource constraint in period t is:
(1− µ)
∞∑
σ=0
(1− p)σ pct (σ) + µct (∞) ≤ [1− (1− µ) p] yl + (1− µ) pyh (32)
The participation constraints can be written as:
Es
[ ∞∑
t=s
βt−su (ct (σt))
∣∣∣∣∣σs
]
≥ V (σs) (33)
∞∑
t=s
βt−su (ct (∞)) ≥
u
(
yl
)
1− β (34)
33σ =∞ denotes an agent who has always received yl.
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where σt denotes the realisation of σ in period t, given an initial value σs ∈ N in period
s, and V (σ) is given by:
V (σ) : =
u
(
yh
)
+ β
1−β
[
pu(yh) + (1− p)u(yl)] if σ = 0
u
(
yl
)
+ β
1−β
[
pu(yh) + (1− p)u(yl)] if σ > 0
9.2.2 Ramsey policy
Ramsey policy in this environment has the well-known property that the cross-sectional
Pareto weight on agents who are exposed to income risk is non-decreasing over time.34
In initial time periods the promise-making constraints only bind for agents who receive
a high income draw. This raises these agents' within-period Pareto weights, and thus
their share of consumption. Since aggregate resources are ﬁxed, the eﬀect of this is to
reduce the share of consumption going to income-poor agents over time, until eventually
even those with permanently low incomes come up against their participation constraint
(34). The long-run allocation is one in which income-poor agents are given consumption
equal to yl in perpetuity. These dynamics are charted in Figure 4, for an illustrative
calibration.35
9.2.3 Time-consistently undominated policy
Under symmetric time-consistently undominated policy, allocations satisfy the condition:
u′ (ct (σ)) (1 + βσλmt (0)) = ηt (35)
where λmt (0) is the multiplier on the promise-making constraint for an agent receiving a
high-income shock in t, and ηt is the resource multiplier.
Thus there is geometric decay at rate β in the `augmented' component of Pareto
weights, cross-sectionally, at each point in time. An individual whose current income is
high will receive a Pareto weight of 1 +λmt (0), where λ
m
t (0) must be set suﬃciently high
that this individual wishes to continue participating in the insurance scheme, given the
future allocation. An individual whose income was high one period ago (but not today)
receives a current Pareto weight of 1+βλmt (0), and so on. Individuals' allocations depend
on their exogenous history, but there is no dependence on past multipliers. The consump-
tion allocation is time-invariant, and the resource multiplier ηt is constant through time.
This means low-income individuals are forever able to consume at a level that is elevated
above their income  a permanent social security `safety net'.
34Appendix D.2 provides details.
35Consumption utility is isoelastic, with σ = 1, and β = 0.96. We set yh = 10 and yl = 1, with
p = 0.01 and µ = 0.2.
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Figure 4: Consumption dynamics: TCUP vs Ramsey policy
Figure 4 contrasts outcomes under the Ramsey and time-consistently undominated
policies. The ﬁrst panel charts the evolution of consumption over time for an agent who
receives a high-income shock, conditional on low income thereafter. It compares time-
consistently undominated policy with the dynamics that arise in the Ramsey steady state.
As the discussion indicated, consumption decays far more rapidly under TCUP policy
than Ramsey, because of the active decay in Pareto weights. A counterpart to this is
that consumption levels must be higher under TCUP policy immediately after a shock,
so as to preserve participation incentives. The second panel charts the consumption
of permanently low-income agents over time. It conﬁrms that Ramsey policy ultimately
drives even permanently low earners against their participation constraints. TCUP policy
does not.
9.3 Asymmetric information
Finally, we consider a variant of the insurance problem with hidden information due to
Atkeson and Lucas (1992).
9.3.1 Setup
The economy receives an aggregate endowment of real income Y¯ in each period, and
has access to a linear savings technology with gross rate of return R > 1. This income
must be divided among consumers, who receive unobservable idiosyncratic shocks to their
marginal utility of consumption over time. An individual's lifetime utility from period s
onwards is:
Es
[ ∞∑
t=s
βt−sθtu (ct)
]
(36)
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where θs ∈
{
θl, θh
}
is a disturbance to the marginal utility of consumption, with θh > θl.
This is iid across agents and time, following the process:
θt =
θl with prob (1− p)θh with prob p
We normalise so that θ¯ := (1− p) θl + pθh = 1. The inﬁnite history of an individual's θ
draws up to a given period t is denoted by σt, with σt := {θt, θt−1, θt−2, ...}, and Σ is the
set of such histories. Time subscripts are omitted from σ where no confusion will arise,
and we will use (σ, θ) to denote the history `σ followed by θ'. Knowledge of this history
on the part of the policymaker is assumed in t for all agents, though it would not change
the analysis if this were generated ﬁctitiously for periods prior to 0.
The period-by-period resource constraint is:
ˆ
σ∈Σ
ct (σ) dΠ (σ) +Bt ≤ Y¯ +RBt−1 (37)
where Bt denotes savings in real bonds from t to t+1. The utilitarian ﬁrst-best allocation
would imply a higher within-period consumption level for agents who draw θh. Since θ
is private information, this gives agents with θl an incentive to mis-report. Accounting
for this, a second-best solution must satisfy an incentive compatibility restriction to
guarantee truthful reporting:
Es
[ ∞∑
t=s
βt−sθtu (ct (σt))
∣∣∣∣∣σs
]
≥ Es
[ ∞∑
t=s
βt−sθtu (ct (σ˜t (σt)))
∣∣∣∣∣σs
]
(38)
where σ˜t : Σ → Σ denotes an arbitrary reporting strategy for all t, restricted to be self-
consistent through time.36 Note that (38) takes the form of constraint (6) rather than (5),
for which the general analysis was developed. The extension of the main necessity and
suﬃciency proofs to this case is straightforward, and developed in Appendix C. It is easy
to show that the only binding incentive compatibility constraint will be the restriction
that low types should wish to report truthfully, and we proceed on this basis in what
follows.
36That is, if σ′ is a possible successor history to σ, σ˜t+1 (σ′) must be a possible successor history to
σ˜t (σ) for all t.
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9.3.2 Ramsey policy
A characteristic feature of Ramsey-optimal choice in this environment is that it satisﬁes
the so-called `inverse Euler equation', given in this case by:37
βREt−1
[
1
uc,t (ct (σt))
∣∣∣∣σt−1] = Et−1 [ 1uc,t+1 (ct+1 (σt+1))
∣∣∣∣σt−1] (39)
With standard preferences we have that uc,t > 0, and so both sides of this equation
are bounded above zero. In the event that R ≤ β−1, (39) is a supermartingale in the
object:
Et−1
[
1
uc,t (ct (σt))
∣∣∣∣σt−1]
and so this object must converge a.s. to a ﬁnite limit. It is possible to show that there
are always incentives to induce consumption diﬀerentials so long as consumption remains
positive, so the implication is that consumption converges to zero for Π-almost all type
histories in Σ as time progresses. This is the well-known `immiseration' result, variants
of which were ﬁrst discovered by Green (1987) and Thomas and Worrall (1990).
9.3.3 Time-consistently undominated policy
Under a symmetric time-consistently undominated policy, the equivalent condition to (39)
is a period-by-period cross-sectional restriction on individuals' inverse marginal utilities,
relative to a benchmark:
Et−1
[
1
uc,t (ct (σ, θ))
− 1
ηt
∣∣∣∣σ−] = βEt−1 [ 1uc,t (ct (σ−, θ)) − 1ηt
∣∣∣∣σ−] (40)
where σ is a successor history to σ−, so that (σ, θ) is a history realised two periods after
σ−, and ηt is again the shadow value of resources.
Thus the average value of the inverse marginal utility of consumption in period t, taken
across agents who received the given shock history σ− up to a period t− s, converges to
1
ηt
at rate β as s increases. In the event that R = β−1, ηt will be constant through time,
and the outcome will be a time-invariant consumption distribution. The immiseration
result no longer applies.
10 Conclusion
Kydland and Prescott problems are environments where it is not possible to choose
optimally, all of the time. The challenge for normative policy design is whether to respond
to this with a choice that is optimal at just one point in time, or to try to ﬁnd an
37See Appendix D.3 for derivation.
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alternative approach to choice that can be implemented in all periods. The purpose of
our paper has been to explore the second option. The outcome of this that we propose
 time-consistently undominated policy  is particularly interesting because it mandates
simple, normatively appealing choices that diﬀer from the Ramsey benchmark both in
the short run and the long run. We have shown this both in a general setting, and in a
number of textbook examples.
Formally, our analysis is purely normative. It assumes that the policymaker can com-
mit perfectly to a sequence of future choices, and does not analyse the positive question of
whether this commitment can be supported in a noncooperative equilibrium.38 But the
commitment assumption does raise a positive issue of its own. If it were indeed possible
for the policymaker in period 0 to commit to any feasible policy, why would they ever
fail to select the Ramsey-optimal choice?
A simple answer to this is that in practice governments simply do not appear to design
policy rules that exhibit the date-contingent character of Ramsey policy. No central bank,
for instance, has an inﬂation target that depends on the number of years elapsed since
the delegation framework was ﬁrst devised. There appears to be a practical desire to
avoid arbitrary time variation in policy, and a theory that enables this formally can only
aid macroeconomic policy design.
A more subtle response relates to the connection between the choice procedure and the
commitment assumption itself. In reality no society has access to a perfect commitment
device ex-ante, resistant to all conceivable challenges. Laws can always be repealed, and
constitutions amended or rewritten.39 But a commitment may be particularly exposed to
challenge if its continuation cannot be justiﬁed by reapplying the principles that selected
it in the ﬁrst place. If an optimal policy was appropriate yesterday, why not today? The
normative principles that we set out in this paper allow choice that will be robust to this
sort of challenge. In itself this may make the commitment assumption far more credible.
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A Proofs of Propositions
Proof of Proposition 1
As noted in the text, it is simple to show that the optimal constant policy implies the
following values for yct and pi
c
t for all t:
yct =
χ (1− β)2
γ2 + χ (1− β)2y
∗ (41)
pict =
χγ (1− β)
γ2 + χ (1− β)2y
∗ (42)
For this policy to be dominated in some period s, there would have to exist an al-
ternative policy (y¯′s, p¯i
′
s) such that the loss associated with (the continuation of) this
policy is strictly lower in every period from s on. The constraint set is linear and the
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loss function is convex, so this in turn implies that a diﬀerential movement from (y¯cs , p¯i
c
s)
along the vector [(y¯cs , p¯i
c
s)− (y¯′s, p¯i′s)] must be welfare-improving at the margin. Denote
the corresponding sequence of derivatives
{
dyt
d∆
, dpit
d∆
}∞
t=s
, where ∆ is a normalisation factor.
Since policy choices under both alternatives are bounded for all t, the derivatives must
also satisfy a bound:
∣∣dpit
d∆
∣∣ < Π¯ and ∣∣dyt
d∆
∣∣ < Y¯ for all t and some Π¯ and Y¯ values. Since
(y¯′s, p¯i
′
s) is a strict improvement on (y¯
c
s , p¯i
c
s) for all r ≥ s, by deﬁnition there must exist
some value δ > 0, independent of r, such that the following is true for all r ≥ s:
−
∞∑
t=r
βt−r
[
pict
dpit
d∆
+ χ (yct − y∗)
dyt
d∆
]
≥ δ (43)
From the Phillips curve constraint, we know:
dyt
d∆
=
1
γ
[
dpit
d∆
− βdpit+1
d∆
]
(44)
Substituting this into inequality (43) gives:
βχγ
γ2 + χ (1− β)2y
∗
{ ∞∑
t=r
βt−r
dpit
d∆
−
∞∑
t=r+1
βt−r−1
dpit
d∆
}
≥ δ (45)
Deﬁne Dr :=
∑∞
t=r β
t−r dpit
d∆
. Notice that since dpit
d∆
is uniformly bounded in absolute value
for all t, Dr is uniformly bounded in absolute value for all r. But condition (45) can be
rewritten as:
Dr+1 ≤ Dr − δ˜ (46)
where δ˜ := δ
[
βχγ
γ2+χ(1−β)2y
∗
]−1
> 0. Since this must hold for all r ≥ s, the boundedness
of Dr is contradicted.
Proof of Proposition 2
Suppose the alternative allocation (x¯′t, a¯
′
t) ∈ Tt∩Ξg
(
x∗t−1
)
was strictly preferred to(x¯∗t, a¯
∗
t)
in period t > s under Wt. Since preferences are recursive, the composite allocation
((x¯t−1∗r , x¯
′
t) , (a¯
t−1∗
r , a¯
′
t)) would then be strictly superior to (x¯
∗
s, a¯
∗
s) from the perspective
of period s. But since Ts is complete, this composite belongs to Ts ∩ Ξg (xs−1). This
contradicts (x¯∗s, a¯
∗
s) being in the arg max set in period s.
Proof of Proposition 3
The two conditions required for a time-consistently comparable set are set out in the
deﬁnition in Section 4.2.1. The `if' part of the Proposition is straightforward. Complete-
ness (part 1 of the deﬁnition) is true by assumption, so only condition 2 in the deﬁnition
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needs to be conﬁrmed. This follows immediately from (9), which guarantees that any past
promises that (x¯′t, a¯
′
t) keeps must also be respected by all other policies in the constraint
set, for all t ≥ s.
For `only if', suppose ﬁrst that an allocation (x¯∗s, a¯
∗
s) ∈ Ts violated (8) for some σ and
t. By the completeness of Ts, we have
((
x¯t∗s , x¯
′
t+1
)
,
(
a¯t∗s , a¯
′
t+1
)) ∈ Ts. But since ω′t+1 (σ)
is generated by
(
x¯′t+1, a¯
′
t+1
)
, this allocation violates (5) for the given σ and t. This is
inconsistent with Ts ⊆ Ξh.
Suppose instead that (x¯∗s, a¯
∗
s) ∈ Ts violates (8) when σ = σt−1 in some period t. As-
sumption 2 together with the continuity of h and h0 and compactness of Aσ (Assumption
4) implies it will always be possible to ﬁnd a˜t−1 such that, for this σt−1 realisation:
Et−1
[
h (a˜t−1 (σt−1) , σt−1) + β
∞∑
τ=0
βτh
(
a′t+τ (σt+τ ) , σt+τ
)∣∣∣∣∣σt−1
]
= h0 (a˜t−1 (σt−1) , σt−1)
(47)
Now consider the composite allocation
((
x∗t , x¯
′
t+1
)
,
(
a∗t , a¯
′
t+1
)) ∈ Tt. The maintained
hypothesis is:
Et−1
[
h (a∗t (σt) , σt) + βω
′
t+1 (σt)
∣∣σt−1] < ω′t (σt)
= Et−1
[ ∞∑
τ=0
βτh
(
a′t+τ (σt+τ ) , σt+τ
)∣∣∣∣∣σt−1
]
Combining this with (47) and using the deﬁnition of ω′t+1 (σt):
Et−1
{
h (a˜t−1 (σt−1) , σt−1) + β
[
h (a∗t (σt) , σt) +
∞∑
τ=1
βτh
(
a′t+τ (σt+τ ) , σt+τ
)]∣∣∣∣∣σt−1
}
< h0 (a˜t−1 (σt−1) , σt−1)
Thus the composite allocation violates a prior forward-looking constraint that (x¯′t, a¯
′
t)
satisﬁes. This contradicts condition 2 of the deﬁnition of a time-consistently comparable
set.
Proof of Proposition 4
For part 1 suppose otherwise, and take an allocation (x¯′s, a¯
′
s) ∈ D (xs−1) that does not
solve Problem 1 for the promise values that it induces. Then there is an allocation
(x¯′′s , a¯
′′
s) in the constraint set for Problem 1 with (x¯
′′
s , a¯
′′
s)  (x¯′s, a¯′s). But belonging to
the constraint set for Problem 1 implies that (x¯′′s , a¯
′′
s) satisﬁes conditions (8) and (9) for
the promise values that (x¯′s, a¯
′
s) induces. Thus (by Proposition 3) (x¯
′′
s , a¯
′′
s) belongs to a
complete set of allocations that is time-consistently comparable to (x¯′s, a¯
′
s), and so by
Condition 1 (x¯′′s , a¯
′′
s) TC (x¯′s, a¯′s). This contradicts (x¯′s, a¯′s) ∈ D (xs−1).
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For part 2 it is suﬃcient to show that any feasible set of allocations that is time-
consistently comparable to (x¯′s, a¯
′
s) must belong to the constraint set for Problem 1, given
the promise values that (x¯′s, a¯
′
s) induces. This is true under Assumption 2, as Proposition
3 established. Since (x¯′s, a¯
′
s) is an optimal choice for Problem 1, constraint dominance is
not possible.
Proof of Proposition 5
Take the `if' part of the claim ﬁrst, and suppose otherwise  so that ω¯′s is undominated, but
(x¯′s, a¯
′
s) /∈ D (xs−1). That is, there is no alternative promise sequence ω¯′′s that dominates
ω¯′s when the initial state vector is x
′
s−1, but there is an alternative allocation (x¯
′′
s , a¯
′′
s) ∈
Ξ˜g
(
x′s−1
)∩Ξh such that (x¯′′s , a¯′′s) TC (x¯′s, a¯′s), where Ξ˜g (x′s−1) is an irrelevant extension
of Ξg
(
x′s−1
)
. Since (x¯′s, a¯
′
s) solves Problem 1 for the promise sequence that it induces,
(x¯′′s , a¯
′′
s) TC (x¯′s, a¯′s) cannot be applying through constraint dominance. Thus we must
have x¯′′s = x¯
′
s, and preference dominance applying such that (x¯
′
t, a¯
′′
t)  (x¯′t, a¯′t) for all
t ≥ s, and at the limit as t→∞.
Consider the promise sequence that (x¯′s, a¯
′′
s) induces, denoted ω¯
′′
s . If (x¯
′
s, a¯
′′
s) ∈ Ξg
(
x′s−1
)
,
then it is immediate that ω¯′′s dominates ω¯
′
s, since a switch to ω¯
′′
t can guarantee at least
as desirable an outcome as (x¯′t, a¯
′′
t) for all t ≥ s. Thus (x¯′s, a¯′′s) /∈ Ξg
(
x′s−1
)
. But then it
follows from the deﬁnition of irrelevant extensions that there is a set of alternative alloca-
tions (x¯′′′t , a¯
′′′
t ) ∈ Ξg
(
x′t−1
)∩Ξh for all t ≥ s (with the chosen (x¯′′′t , a¯′′′t ) potentially varying
in t) such that (x¯′′′t , a¯
′′′
t ) TC (x¯′t, a¯′′t). This ordering either applies through constraint
dominance or preference dominance. For constraint dominance to apply, by Proposition
4 each (x¯′′′t , a¯
′′′
t ) must satisfy the constraint set for Problem 1 generated by the promise
sequence ω¯′′t , and deliver higher welfare than (x¯
′
t, a¯
′′
t) for all t ≥ s. Since (x¯′t, a¯′′t) in turn
delivers higher welfare than (x¯′t, a¯
′
t) for all t ≥ s, including at the limit, it follows that
ω¯′′t ωx′t−1 ω¯
′
t for all t ≥ s, including at the limit  a contradiction.
The only remaining possibility is that (x¯′′′t , a¯
′′′
t ) TC (x¯′t, a¯′′t) holds by preference dom-
inance for all t ≥ s. In this case x¯′′′s = x¯′s, and it is immediate that the promise sequence
that (x¯′s, a¯
′′′
s ) induces, say ω¯
′′′
s , dominates ω¯
′
s. This contradiction establishes the ﬁrst part
of the result.
For the `only if' part, suppose otherwise  so that ω¯′s is dominated, but (x¯
′
s, a¯
′
s) ∈
D (xs−1). That is, there is no alternative allocation (x¯∗s, a¯
∗
s) ∈ Ξ˜g
(
x′s−1
) ∩ Ξh such that
(x¯∗s, a¯
∗
s) TC (x¯′s, a¯′s), where Ξ˜g
(
x′s−1
)
is an irrelevant extension of Ξg
(
x′s−1
)
, but there
is an alternative promise sequence ω¯′′s that dominates ω¯
′
s when the initial state vector is
x′s−1. Since (x¯
′
s, a¯
′
s) solves Problem 1 for the promise sequence ω¯
′
s, this means that for
all t ≥ s (and at any limit as t → ∞) there exists a sequence (x¯′′t , a¯′′t) ∈ Ξg
(
x′t−1
) ∩ Ξh
such that (x¯′′t , a¯
′′
t)  (x¯′t, a¯′t), with (x¯′′t , a¯′′t) satisfying the constraints for Problem 1 when
the promise sequence is ω¯′′t . Denote by W
′′
t the value of the social welfare criterion
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when (x¯′′t , a¯
′′
t) is implemented, and W
′
t when (x¯
′
t, a¯
′
t) is implemented. Likewise, r
′
t is
used as shorthand for
∑
σt∈Σ r (a
′
t (σt) , σt) Π (σt), equivalently for r
′′
t , and so on. r¯ :=
supat∈A
∑
σt∈Σ r (a
′
t (σt) , σt) Π (σt) is an upper bound on rt, whose existence follows from
Assumption 4.
By the deﬁnition of dominance, there must exist an ε > 0 such that W ′′t −W ′t ≥ ε
for all t ≥ s. For all t ≥ s, let r′′′t ∈ [r′t, r¯] be some number chosen so that the sequence
{r′′′τ }τ≥t satisﬁes the following inequality for all t ≥ s:∑
τ=t
βτ−t (r′′′t − r′t) ∈
[ε
2
, (W ′′t −W ′t)
)
W ′′t −W ′t ≥ ε implies that for all t ≥ s there must exist a τ ≥ t such that r′t < r¯, so there
is always scope to satisfy this inequality by a choice of ε suﬃciently close to zero. By the
normalisation in Section 3.4.1, it is always possible to ﬁnd a sequence a¯′′′s ∈ A such that a¯′′′s
induces the promise sequence ω¯′′s and implies a value for the policy criterion of r
′′′
t for all
t ≥ s. Now suppose the constraint set Ξg (x′s−1) is expanded to Ξg (x′s−1)∪ (x¯′s, a¯′′′s ), and
let W ′′′t be the value of the discounted social welfare criterion in period t when (x¯
′
s, a¯
′′′
s ) is
implemented. By construction, (x¯′t, a¯
′′′
t ) induces a promise sequence that is also satisﬁed
by (x¯′′t , a¯
′′
t) for all t ≥ s, and W ′′′t < W ′′t for all t ≥ s, so (x¯′′t , a¯′′t) constraint-dominates
(x¯′t, a¯
′′′
t ) for all t ≥ s. Hence Ξg
(
x′s−1
) ∪ (x¯′s, a¯′′′s ) is an irrelevant extension of Ξg (x′s−1).
But W ′′′t −W ′t ≥ ε2 > 0 for all t ≥ s, and (x¯′s, a¯′′′s ) and (x¯′s, a¯′s) imply the same state vector
in every period, so (x¯′s, a¯
′′′
s ) TC (x¯′s, a¯′s). Hence (x¯′s, a¯′s) cannot belong to D (xs−1).
Proof of Proposition 6
Let ω¯′t be the promise sequence induced by the Ramsey allocation, and consider the direc-
tional derivative δV
(
ω¯′t, x
′
t−1; w¯t
)
for some t > s. Rearranging the result in Proposition
13, this derivative will be given by:
δV
(
ω¯′t, x
′
t−1; w¯t
)
= −
ˆ
σ∈Σ
λkt (σ)wt (σ) dΠ (σ)
+
∞∑
τ=t+1
βτ−t
ˆ
σ∈Σ
{[
λmτ−1 (σ) + λ
k
τ−1 (σ−)
]− λkτ (σ)}wτ (σ) dΠ (σ)
= −
ˆ
σ∈Σ
λkt (σ)wt (σ) dΠ (σ)
where wt (σ) ∈ Rj denotes the component of w¯s particular to date t ≥ s and state σ ∈ Σ,
σ− is the predecessor history to σ, and we have used the Ramsey optimality condition (11)
to simplify. The result follows by noting that any vector of derivatives w¯s with wt (σ) < 0
for all t and all σ in the speciﬁed positive-measure subset of Σ will deliver a marginal
improvement in V
(
ω¯′t, x
′
t−1
)
for all t > s, bounded above zero. Thus by Proposition 5,
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(x¯′t, a¯
′
t) cannot belong to D
(
x′t−1
)
for any t ≥ s.
Proof of Proposition 7
By Proposition 4, if (x¯′t, a¯
′
t) belongs to D
(
x′t−1
)
for all t ≥ s, (x¯′t, a¯′t) must solve Problem
1 for the promises that this allocation induces, denoted ω′t. Thus by Proposition 5 it must
be the case that ω′t is undominated according to the ordering ωx′t−1 for all t ≥ s. Note
also that the assumption V is diﬀerentiable at the chosen promise sequence implies that
ω′t must be strictly interior to Ω (xs−1). As above, let δV
(
ω¯′s, x
′
s−1; w¯s
)
be the directional
(Gateaux) derivative of V
(
ω¯′s, x
′
s−1
)
as ω¯s is varied along dimension w¯s, and note that w¯s
is required to be an element of the same vector space as ω¯′s (with wt (σ) ∈ Rj denoting the
component of w¯s particular to date t ≥ s and state σ ∈ Σ). If h is diﬀerence comparable
then this is the space of promise sequences with bounded element-wise diﬀerences from
one another. These diﬀerences will be invariant to any equivalent representation of the
promises. If h is ratio comparable then the relevant space is the space of promise sequences
with bounded ratio diﬀerences from one another. Again, these diﬀerences will be invariant
to equivalent representations.
As Proposition 13 shows, the derivative at diﬀerentiable points can be written as:
δV
(
ω¯′s, x
′
s−1; w¯s
)
=
∞∑
t=s
βt−s
ˆ
σ∈Σ
{
β
[
λmt (σ) + λ
k
t (σ−)
]
wt+1 (σ)− λkt (σ)wt (σ)
}
dΠ (σ)
Now ﬁx some σ ∈ Σ, and suppose that there is a period τ such that the terms[
λmt (σ) + λ
k
t (σ−)
]
and λkt (σ) are both bounded above zero for all t ≥ τ . For each period
t, consider the within-period component of the previous derivative expression, particular
to σ:
β
[
λmt (σ) + λ
k
t (σ−)
]
wt+1 (σ)− λkt (σ)wt (σ)
By the fact that the multiplier terms are bounded above zero, for any given wt (σ) it
is possible to make the preceeding expression exceed any arbirtary constant εt > 0 by
choosing wt+1 (σ) to satisfy:
β
[
λmt (σ) + λ
k
t (σ−)
]
wt+1 (σ)− λkt (σ)wt (σ) ≥ εt (48)
Diﬀerence-comparable h We ﬁrst proceed under the assumption that h is diﬀerence
comparable. In this case, the Gateaux derivative is deﬁned for a bounded sequence
{wt (σ)}t≥τ for any σ ∈ Σ. If this sequence is such that inequality (48) can be satisﬁed
for all t ≥ τ for a sequence of εt values bounded above zero, and if this is true for all σ in
a positive-measure subset of Σ, then the diﬀerential movement w¯τ will generate a strict
improvement for all policymakers from τ onwards, contradicting that ω′t is undominated
according to the ordering ωx′t−1 for all t ≥ τ .
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Suppose ﬁrst that there is geometric convergence in the product
∏T−1
t=τ
λkt (σ)
β[λmt (σ)+λkt (σ−)]
to zero, i.e. for any τ ≥ s there exists a ρ ∈ (0, 1) and K > 0 such that for all T > τ :
KρT−τ >
T−1∏
t=τ
λkt (σ)
β
[
λmt (σ) + λ
k
t (σ−)
]
Then let wτ (σ) > 0, and for all t ≥ τ set wt+1 (σ) > 0 recursively to satisfy the condition:
wt+1 (σ)
wt (σ)
≥ (1 + γ) λ
k
t (σ)
β
[
λmt (σ) + λ
k
t (σ−)
] (49)
for some γ > 0 such that ρ (1 + γ) < 1, together with some lower bound wt+1 (σ) ≥ w > 0
and an upper bound wt+1 (σ) ≤ w¯ <∞. This upper bound is possible, because we have
that:
K [ρ (1 + γ)]T−τ > (1 + γ)T−τ
T−1∏
t=τ
λkt (σ)
β
[
λmt (σ) + λ
k
t (σ−)
]
and the object on the left-hand side converges to zero, whilst the existence of the lower
bound is trivial. Given these values for the sequence {wt (σ)}t≥τ , set εt to satisfy:
λkt (σ)
β
[
λmt (σ) + λ
k
t (σ−)
] + εt
β
[
λmt (σ) + λ
k
t (σ−)
]
wt (σ)
= (1 + γ)
λkt (σ)
β
[
λmt (σ) + λ
k
t (σ−)
]
or:
εt = γλ
k
t (σ)wt (σ)
Using this in (49) conﬁrms that (48) is satisﬁed, and the bounds on λkt (σ) and wt (σ)
imply εt is bounded above zero as required.
The alternative possibility when the multipliers are always strictly positive is that
K
(
1
ρ
)T−τ
<
∏T−1
t=τ
λkt (σ)
β[λmt (σ)+λkt (σ−)]
for some K > 0 and ρ ∈ (0, 1). In this case choose
some γ ∈ (0, 1) suﬃciently small that (1−γ)
ρ
> 1. Let wτ (σ) < 0, and for all t ≥ τ set
wt+1 (σ) < 0 recursively so that the following is satisﬁed:
wt+1 (σ)
wt (σ)
≤ (1− γ) λ
k
t (σ)
β
[
λmt (σ) + λ
k
t (σ−)
]
together with the bound:
|wt+1 (σ)| ≥ w
for some w > 0, and a similar upper bound. The existence of w follows from the fact
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that:
0 < K
(
1− γ
ρ
)T−τ
< (1− γ)T−τ
T−1∏
t=τ
λkt (σ)
β
[
λmt (σ) + λ
k
t (σ−)
]
for all T , and 1−γ
ρ
> 1. Now let εt be deﬁned for all t ≥ τ by:
λkt (σ)
β
[
λmt (σ) + λ
k
t (σ−)
] + εt
β
[
λmt (σ) + λ
k
t (σ−)
]
wt (σ)
= (1− γ) λ
k
t (σ)
β
[
λmt (σ) + λ
k
t (σ−)
]
So that:
εt = −γλkt (σ)wt (σ)
which is bounded above zero for all t. Thus there is a strict improvement in all periods,
again contradicting that ω¯′t is undominated according to the ordering ωx′t−1 for all t ≥ τ .
Ratio-comparable h When h is instead ratio comparable, the main formal adjustment
to the proof is to take the Gateaux derivative as a bounded sequence of proportional
deviations from the individual promises ω′t (σ): {wt (σ)}t≥τ = {w˜t (σ)ω′t (σ)}t≥τ , with
{w˜t (σ)} satisfying a uniform bound in t for any σ ∈ Σ. These proportional changes are
independent of any admissible renormalisation by deﬁnition, and so can be generated by
taking limits from alternative promise sequences that live in the same vector space as
ω¯′τ .
40 Again, if this sequence of diﬀerential changes is such that inequality (48) can be
satisﬁed for all t ≥ τ for a sequence of εt values bounded above zero, and if this is true
for all σ in a positive-measure subset of Σ, then ω′t cannot be undominated for all t ≥ τ .
The argument then proceeds in a similar way to the diﬀerence comparable case. Sup-
pose ﬁrst that there is convergence in the product
∏T−1
t=τ
∣∣∣ ωt(σ)ωt+1(σ) ∣∣∣ λkt (σ)β[λmt (σ)+λkt (σ−)] to zero,
i.e. for any τ ≥ s there exists a ρ ∈ (0, 1) and K > 0 such that for all T > τ :
KρT−τ >
∣∣∣∣ωτ (σ)ωT (σ)
∣∣∣∣ T−1∏
t=τ
λkt (σ)
β
[
λmt (σ) + λ
k
t (σ−)
]
Then choose an initial w˜τ (σ) with |w˜τ (σ)| > 0 and sign (w˜τ (σ)) = sign (ωτ (σ)), and for
all t ≥ τ set w˜t+1 (σ) such that sign (w˜t+1 (σ)) = sign (ωt+1 (σ)) and w˜t+1 (σ) recursively
satisﬁes: ∣∣∣∣w˜t+1 (σ)w˜t (σ)
∣∣∣∣ ≥ (1 + γ) λkt (σ)β [λmt (σ) + λkt (σ−)]
∣∣∣∣ ωt (σ)ωt+1 (σ)
∣∣∣∣ (50)
for some γ > 0 such that ρ (1 + γ) < 1, together with some lower bound w˜t+1 (σ) ≥ w˜ > 0
and an upper bound w˜t+1 (σ) ≤ ¯˜w <∞. This upper bound is possible, because we have
40Part 1 of the Proposition implies ωt (σ) > 0, so the use of this as a reference point in deﬁning the
derivatives is not restrictive.
55
that:
K [ρ (1 + γ)]T−τ > (1 + γ)T−τ
∣∣∣∣ωτ (σ)ωT (σ)
∣∣∣∣ T−1∏
t=τ
λkt (σ)
β
[
λmt (σ) + λ
k
t (σ−)
]
and the object on the left-hand side converges to zero, whilst the possibility of the lower
bound is trivial. Note that if sign (ωt (σ)) = sign (ωt+1 (σ)), condition (50) simply states:
w˜t+1 (σ)
w˜t (σ)
≥ (1 + γ) λ
k
t (σ)
β
[
λmt (σ) + λ
k
t (σ−)
] ωt (σ)
ωt+1 (σ)
whereas if sign (ωt (σ)) 6= sign (ωt+1 (σ)), it implies:
w˜t+1 (σ)
w˜t (σ)
≤ (1 + γ) λ
k
t (σ)
β
[
λmt (σ) + λ
k
t (σ−)
] ωt (σ)
ωt+1 (σ)
Given the sequence {w˜t (σ)}t≥τ , set εt to satisfy:
λkt (σ)ωt (σ)
β
[
λmt (σ) + λ
k
t (σ−)
]
ωt+1 (σ)
+
εt
β
[
λmt (σ) + λ
k
t (σ−)
]
ωt+1 (σ) w˜t (σ)
= (1 + γ)
λkt (σ)ωt (σ)
β
[
λmt (σ) + λ
k
t (σ−)
]
ωt+1 (σ)
or:
εt = γλ
k
t (σ)ωt (σ) w˜t (σ)
Using this in (50), and multiplying through by β
[
λmt (σ) + λ
k
t (σ−)
]
ωt+1 (σ) w˜t (σ), con-
ﬁrms that (48) is satisﬁed,41 and the bounds on λkt (σ)ωt (σ) and w˜t (σ) imply εt is
bounded above zero as required.
The case where K
(
1
ρ
)T−τ
<
∣∣∣ ωτ (σ)ωT (σ) ∣∣∣∏T−1t=τ λkt (σ)β[λmt (σ)+λkt (σ−)] for some K > 0 and ρ ∈
(0, 1) can proceed by a symmetric adjustment to the proof from the diﬀerence-comparable
case.
Proof of Proposition 8
The proof adopts the same approach as for Proposition 7, showing that a diﬀerential
change to promises can generate an improvement in all periods when the stated conditions
are not met. We ﬁrst show that there must exist an αt ≥ 0 such that the equality in the
proof is almost always true, with the bounds on αt established subsequently.
Suppose that there does not exist an αt such that the equality in the proof is satisﬁed
in t for Π-almost all σ. This means that in t there must be at least one degree of linear in-
dependence across (positive-measure values of) σ between the values of
[
λmt (σ) + λ
k
t (σ−)
]
and of λkt+1 (σ). Hence, under diﬀerence comparability, it is possible to ﬁnd bounded
41Note that the sign of this expression will be negative if and only if sign (ωt (σ)) 6= sign (ωt+1 (σ)).
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diﬀerential changes {wt+1 (σ)}σ∈Σ such that the following two restrictions are met:
ˆ
σ∈Σ
λkt+1 (σ)wt+1 (σ) dΠ (σ) = 0 (51)ˆ
σ∈Σ
[
λmt (σ) + λ
k
t (σ−)
]
wt+1 (σ) dΠ (σ) ≥ 1 (52)
Now, if the requirement in the proof is not satisﬁed, then it is possible to ﬁnd is a
positive-measure subset of Σ that violates condition (14) by at least an amount ε at least
every T periods, with ε > 0 and T ﬁnite. Thus at least every T periods it must be
possible to satisfy conditions (51) and (52) with values for wt (σ) that are bounded in
absolute value below some w¯, uniform in t, and bounded away from zero for a positive-
measure subset of Σ. Hence a strictly positive diﬀerential improvement is available of
an amount at least equal to βT−1 in each period, applying the same logic as in the
previous propositions. This contradicts that the original policy was time-consistently
undominated, given Proposition 5. The case of ratio comparability proceeds on the
same lines, normalising the derivatives by the promise values to preserve invariance.
We next show that αt ≤ 1 can be imposed. Suppose otherwise. Then under diﬀer-
ence comparability there must exist a T <∞ such that for all σ in a positive-measure
subset of Σ, in every period t there is a period t+ τ with τ < T and:
λmt+τ (σ) + λ
k
t+τ (σ−)− λkt+τ+1 (σ) ≤ −δ
for some δ > 0. Now consider the diﬀerential change to ω¯s given by w¯s such that
wt+τ (σ) = −1 for all date-states in which this inequality is true, and zero otherwise. In
all period t+ τ this delivers a diﬀerential improvement in σ-speciﬁc value given by:
−λmt+τ (σ)− λkt+τ (σ−) + λkt+τ+1 (σ) ≥ δ > 0
and in period t+ τ + 1 the improvement is:
λkt+τ+1 (σ) ≥ δ > 0
Hence at any given t, for each state σ in the relevant subset of Σ there is a feasible
diﬀerential improvement at least equal to βT−1δ. Since this is true in a positive-measure
subset of Σ, the improvement is bounded above zero in value when assessed in any period
t ≥ s, so the original ωs is dominated. A near-identical argument applies under ratio
comparability, allowing for normalisation by the promise values.
Finally, we show that αt > 0 can be imposed. Then under diﬀerence comparability
there must exist time periods t such that for a positive-measure subset of σ, the following
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are true:
λmt (σ) + λ
k
t (σ−) ≥ δ
λkt+1 (σ) = 0
Consider a diﬀerential change wt+1 (σ) = 1, applied in all such date-states. The marginal
value of this is at least βδ for state σ and date t. When the claim in the Proposition
is not true, there is always a time period within T of the current date such that these
gains can be realised for a positive-measure subset of states σ. Thus again there is a
boundedly-positive marginal improvement available in net present value at every point in
time, contradicting that the original policy was time-consistently undominated. Again,
the case of ratio comparability proceeds symmetrically, setting wt+1 (σ) = |ωt+1 (σ)|
in this case, to preserve invariance.
Proof of Proposition 9
We present the main proof under diﬀerence comparability. Quasiconcavity of the
value function implies, by the usual logic, that the absence of marginal gains from mov-
ing allocations along a given vector dimension will also ensure the absence of discrete
gains. Thus, applying Proposition 5, it is suﬃcient to show that when the three spec-
iﬁed conditions are satisﬁed, there is no marginal change to the promises w¯s such that
δ
(
V
(
ω¯′t, x
′
t−1
)
, w¯t
)
will be bounded above zero for all t suﬃciently large, including at
the limit as t→∞.
We start with two deﬁnitions. It aids the proof to deﬁne the scalar ηt for t ≥ s
recursively by:
ηs : = 1
and for t > s:
ηt =
αt−1
β
ηt−1
Note that ηt > 0 for all t, since αt ∈ (0, 1).
In addition, for all t ≥ s and σ ∈ Σ, deﬁne ∆t (σ) as a measure of the deviation from
the limit in Condition 2(b):
λkt+1 (σ) (1 + ∆t (σ))
αt
[
λmt (σ) + λ
k
t (σ−)
] ≡ 1 (53)
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Note that linear convergence implies that the product:
r∏
τ=t
(1 + ∆τ (σ))
converges to a ﬁnite positive constant as r →∞.
Condition 2(a) in the Proposition states that the following object is bounded above
zero and below ∞, uniformly in r, for all σ ∈ Σ:
r−1∏
t=τ
λkt (σ)
β
[
λmt (σ) + λ
k
t (σ−)
]
Applying the identity (53), this can be rewritten as follows:
r−1∏
t=τ
λkt (σ)
β
[
λmt (σ) + λ
k
t (σ−)
] = r−1∏
t=τ
αt
β
λkt (σ)
λkt+1 (σ) (1 + ∆t (σ))
=
λkτ (σ)
λkr (σ)
r−1∏
t=τ
ηt+1
ηt (1 + ∆t (σ))
=
λkτ (σ)
λkr (σ)
ηr
ητ
r−1∏
t=τ
1
(1 + ∆t (σ))
(54)
Since the ﬁnal product term in (1 + ∆t (σ)) is bounded, it follows that the object
λkτ (σ)
λkr (σ)
ηr
ητ
must likewise be bounded above zero and below ∞, uniformly in r, for all τ
We can further deﬁne λ˜kt (σ) by:
λ˜kt (σ) :=
1
ηt
λkt (σ)
Notice that the boundedness of λ
k
τ (σ)
λkr (σ)
ηr
ητ
implies that λ˜kt (σ) is bounded above zero and
below ∞ in t for all σ, irrespective of the convergence properties of λkt (σ) and ηt.
Now suppose, contrary to the claim in the Proposition, that there exists an alternative
promise sequence ω¯s that is bounded away from the lower contour set of ω¯
′
s for all t ≥ τ ,
and some τ ≥ s. We ﬁrst translate this into a derivative statement. As shown in
Proposition 13, the Gateaux derivative in all periods t ≥ τ satisﬁes:
δV
(
ω¯′t, x
′
t−1; w¯t
)
=
∞∑
r=t
βr−t
ˆ
σ∈Σ
{
β
[
λmr (σ) + λ
k
r (σ−)
]
wr+1 (σ)− λkr (σ)wr (σ)
}
dΠ (σ)
where wr (σ) is the marginal increase in the date-state-speciﬁc promise ω
′
r (σ). Using the
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deﬁnition of ∆r (σ) above, this can be rewritten as:
δV
(
ω¯′t, x
′
t−1; w¯t
)
=
∞∑
r=t
βr−t
ˆ
σ∈Σ
{
βλkr+1 (σ)
1
αr
[1 + ∆r (σ)]wr+1 (σ)− λkr (σ)wr (σ)
}
dΠ (σ)
Since λkt (σ) is not guaranteed to be bounded (above or below) in t, this object need not be
bounded, which in general will not allow us to reason from ﬁnite diﬀerential improvements
in V to boundedly positive gains in promise space and vice-versa.42 To overcome this,
we can normalise it by ηt, giving:
δV
(
ω¯′t, x
′
t−1; w¯t
)
ηt
=
∞∑
r=t
βr−t
ηr
ηt
ˆ
σ∈Σ
{
λ˜kr+1 (σ) [1 + ∆r (σ)]wr+1 (σ)− λ˜kr (σ)wr (σ)
}
dΠ (σ)
This is equivalent to rescaling the value function in t by the factor 1
ηt
. By the recursive
deﬁnition of ηt, we have:
βr−t
ηr
ηt
=
r−1∏
τ=t
ατ < α¯
r−t
with α¯ < 1, so the boundedness of λ˜kr+1 (σ) and convergence of ∆r (σ) (Condition 2(b))
implies we have limt→∞ supw¯t
[
δV (ω¯′t,x′t−1;w¯t)
ηt
]
<∞, recalling that wt (σ) must be bounded
uniformly in t by the deﬁnition of the derivative. It follows from the concavity of V that
the alternative promise sequence ω¯′′t := (ω¯
′
t + αw¯t) is bounded away from the lower
contour set of ω¯′t for all t ≥ τ only if
δV (ω¯′t,x′t−1;w¯t)
ηt
≥ ε holds for all t ≥ τ , some τ ≥ s
and ε > 0. Thus an improvement requires a derivative vector with the property:
∞∑
r=t
βr−t
ηr
ηt
ˆ
σ∈Σ
{
λ˜kr+1 (σ) [1 + ∆r (σ)]wr+1 (σ)− λ˜kr (σ)wr (σ)
}
dΠ (σ) ≥ ε (55)
for all t suﬃciently large. Note that by Condition 2(b), for every  > 0 there is r
suﬃciently large that |∆r (σ)| <  for all σ ∈ Σ.
Rewriting (55) gives:
∞∑
r=t+1
βr−(t+1)
(
β
αr−1
− β
)
ηr
ηt
ˆ
σ∈Σ
λ˜kr (σ)wr (σ) dΠ (σ)
≥
ˆ
σ∈Σ
λ˜kt (σ)wt (σ) dΠ (σ) + ε (56)
−
∞∑
r=t
βr−t
ˆ
σ∈Σ
ηr
ηt
∆r (σ) λ˜
k
r+1 (σ)wr+1 (σ) dΠ (σ)
42If λkt (σ) → ∞ it is possible that a boundedly large increase in V could be achieved by a change
in promise values away from ω¯′t that becomes vanishingly small as t → ∞. This would not satisfy the
requirement for the improving promise sequence to be bounded away from the previous sequence at the
limit as t→∞.
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Using the deﬁnition of ηt, the last term here simpliﬁes to:
∞∑
r=t
[
r−1∏
τ=t
ατ
]ˆ
σ∈Σ
λ˜kr+1 (σ)wr+1 (σ) ∆r (σ) dΠ (σ)
Since αt ≤ α¯ < 1 and λ˜kt (σ) and wt (σ) are both bounded uniformly in t, this expression
converges to 0 as ∆t (σ) does so across σ. Thus it is possible to ﬁnd a suﬃciently large
T such that: ∣∣∣∣∣
∞∑
r=t
[
r−1∏
τ=t
ατ
] ˆ
σ∈Σ
λ˜kr+1 (σ)wr+1 (σ) ∆r (σ) dΠ (σ)
∣∣∣∣∣ < ε2
for all t ≥ T . Using this in inequality (56) implies that for suﬃciently large t we have:
∞∑
r=t+1
βr−(t+1)
(
β
αr−1
− β
)
ηr
ηt
ˆ
σ∈Σ
λ˜kr (σ)wr (σ) dΠ (σ)
≥
ˆ
σ∈Σ
λ˜kt (σ)wt (σ) dΠ (σ) +
ε
2
Now consider the sum: ∞∑
r=t+1
βr−(t+1)
(
β
αr−1
− β
)
ηr
ηt
Since αr ∈ (0, 1) and ηr > 0 for all r, each element of this sum is positive. In addition,
we have:
∞∑
r=t+1
βr−(t+1)
(
β
αr−1
− β
)
ηr
ηt
=
∞∑
r=t+1
βr−(t+1)
(
ηr−1
ηt
− β ηr
ηt
)
=
∞∑
r=t
βr−t
ηr
ηt
−
∞∑
r=t+1
βr−t
ηr
ηt
=
ηt
ηt
= 1
Thus the sum can be interpreted as a probability distribution weighting time periods,
and the expression:
∞∑
r=t+1
βr−(t+1)
(
β
αr−1
− β
)
ηr
ηt
ˆ
σ∈Σ
λ˜kr (σ)wr (σ) dΠ (σ)
is a weighted average of values for
´
σ∈Σ λ˜
k
r (σ)wr (σ) dΠ (σ) across periods r > t. Inequal-
ity (56) states that this weighted average always exceeds the value of the same object in
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t itself, by at least an amount ε
2
> 0. This is possible only if the object:
ˆ
σ∈Σ
λ˜kt (σ)wt (σ) dΠ (σ)
is growing without bound in t. But this is inconsistent with boundedness of wt (σ) and
λ˜kt (σ). The former of these is a necessary requirement for the improving promise sequence
ω¯′′t to be well deﬁned in the chosen vector space, and the latter was established above.
Hence we have a contradiction.
The proof under ratio comparability proceeds near-identically, allowing for the
fact that Gateaux derivatives can now only be established as bounded ratio changes in
promises: {wt (σ)}t≥τ = {ωt (σ) w˜t (σ)}t≥τ , with {w˜t (σ)}t≥τ satisfying a uniform bound.
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B Properties of the value function
The implication of Proposition 5 is that undominated allocations under the ordering
TC can be identiﬁed by reference to preferences across promise sequences, ωxs−1 . These
preferences are deﬁned on the space of promise sequences for which Problem 1 has a
solution. They can be represented by the value function associated with Problem 1.
This representation provides an important step in operationalising our approach. This
Appendix analyses the properties of its two components: the feasible set of promises, and
the value function.
B.1 Feasible promise sequences
For some choices of ω¯s the constraint set for Problem 1 may be empty  there simply
does not exist an allocation that can make good on these promises. Clearly these are not
feasible selections. The set of feasible promise sequences from s onwards is denoted by
Ω (xs−1):
Ω (xs−1) := {ω¯s ∈ W : constraint set to Problem 1 nonempty, given xs−1 ∈ X}
To analyse diﬀerential changes to promises, it is useful to restrict attention to the interior
of Ω (xs−1). This is denoted by Ω˚ (xs−1).
Convexity of Ω (xs−1) An important regularity property to be able to place on Ω (xs−1)
is convexity. The next Proposition establishes the conditions under which this will hold.
Proposition 11. Suppose Assumptions 4 and 5 hold. For any xs ∈ X, the space Ω (xs−1)
is convex.
The proof of this is omitted to avoid repetition: the result follows directly from
arguments contained in the more general proof of Proposition 12 below. Note that the
concavity of r will not be needed for this result.
B.2 Value of the inner problem
The maximised value of the inner problem is denoted by V (ω¯s;xs−1), for all ω¯s ∈ Ω (xs−1)
and all xs−1 ∈ X. For all ωs ∈ W not in Ω (xs−1), we normalise V (ω¯s;xs−1) to -
∞ for convenience. Note that V can be viewed as a cardinalisation of the preference
ordering ωxs−1 , given xs−1. Thus time-consistently undominated promise choices can be
investigated by reference to the eﬀect of promises on the value of V at every horizon.
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Concavity of V As in conventional optimisation theory, a particularly useful prop-
erty for V to exhibit is concavity, as this allows the application of global methods for
constrained optimisation. The next Proposition establishes the conditions under which
concavity will hold.
Proposition 12. Suppose Assumptions 4 and 5 hold. For all xs−1 ∈ X, V (·;xs−1) is
concave in ω¯s ∈ Ω (xs−1).
Proof. To ease notation we suppress the dependence of functions on σ. Consider two
promise sequences ω¯′s, ω¯
′′
s ∈ Ω (xs−1). To establish concavity we must show:
V (αω¯′s + (1− α) ω¯′′s ;xs−1) ≥ αV (ω¯′s;xs−1) + (1− α)V (ω¯′′s ;xs−1) (57)
for all α ∈ (0, 1). Let y¯′ := (x¯′s, a¯′s) and y¯′′ := (x¯′′s , a¯′′s) solve Problem 1 for ω¯′s and ω¯′′s
respectively. It follows from the concavity of r (Assumption 5) that (57) must be satisﬁed
provided the convex combination αy¯′ + (1− α) y¯′′ is feasible when the promise sequence
is αω¯′s + (1− α) ω¯′′s . In this case the feasible selection αy¯′ + (1− α) y¯′′ will deliver a
value at least as great as the right-hand side of (57), which is then a lower bound on
V (αω¯′s + (1− α) ω¯′′s ;xs−1). The quasiconcavity of g implies that if (4) is satisﬁed in all
time periods by both y¯′ and y¯′′ then it must also be satisﬁed by αy¯′ + (1− α) y¯′′. These
constraints are unaﬀected by variations in the promise values. Thus it remains only to
show that constraints (8) and (9) are also satisﬁed by the convex combination. Consider
(8). For all t ≥ s,we need:
h (αa′t + (1− α) a′′t ) + β
[
αω′t+1 + (1− α)ω′′t+1
] ≥ h0 (αa′t + (1− α) a′′t )
Since the constraint is satisﬁed by both y¯′ and y¯′′, we have:
αh (a′t) + (1− α)h (a′′t ) + β
[
αω′t+1 + (1− α)ω′′t+1
] ≥ αh0 (a′t) + (1− α)h0 (a′′t )
But by concavity of h:
h (αa′t + (1− α) a′′t ) ≥ αh (a′t) + (1− α)h (a′′t )
and by convexity of h0:
h0 (αa′t + (1− α) a′′t ) ≤ αh0 (a′t) + (1− α)h0 (a′′t )
Collecting together, this establishes the desired inequality. An identical argument con-
ﬁrms that (9) is likewise satisﬁed for all t ≥ s. Thus αy¯′+ (1− α) y¯′′ is feasible when the
promise sequence is αω′s + (1− α)ω′′s , completing the proof.
Placing this additional structure on V does not come without a cost. Assumption 5
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requires concavity in the h function and convexity in the h0 function  not just quasicon-
cavity/convexity. In many problems of interest these will not be easy to guarantee. As
ever, when the required assumptions are not satisﬁed the analysis can proceed, but with
caveats. The most direct analogy in this case is with the analysis of consumer demand
when the utility function is not known to be quasi-concave.
Concave, real-valued functions of a real interval are well known to have appealing
continuity properties. The following corollary is a standard result:
Corollary 3. Suppose the assumptions for Proposition 12 are true. Fix xs−1 ∈ X, and
let ω¯′s and ω¯
′′
s be arbitrary selections from Ω (xs−1). Then V (αω¯
′
s + (1− α) ω¯′′s ;xs−1) is
continuous in α ∈ [0, 1], has left derivatives with respect to α for all α ∈ (0, 1], and has
right derivatives with respect to α for all α ∈ [0, 1) These derivatives coincide for almost
all α ∈ (0, 1).
This provides a solid basis for taking directional derivatives of V with respect to the
promise sequence.
Derivatives of V The analysis that follows will characterise time-consistently undom-
inated policy by reference to the slope of the V function as promises are varied. For
xs−1 ∈ X and ω¯s ∈ Ω (xs−1), the directional (Gateaux) derivative of V is denoted by
δV (ω¯s, xs−1; w¯s), deﬁned for all w¯s ∈ W by:43
δV (ω¯s, xs−1; w¯s) := lim
α→0
1
α
[
V
(
ω¯′s + αw¯s;x
′
s−1
)− V (ω¯′s;x′s−1)]
wherever this limit exists. Where V is not diﬀerentiable in the relevant dimension,
δ+V (ω¯s, xs−1; w¯s) will denote the above limit as α → 0 from above, and δ−V (ω¯s, xs−1; w¯s)
as α→ 0 from below.
Where V is diﬀerentiable, the usual envelope results for value functions will apply, so
that the derivatives of V will be deﬁned in terms of Lagrange multipliers on the promise-
keeping and promise-making constraints.
In general we denote the present-value multiplier on promise-keeping constraint (9)
for history σ in period t by λkt (σ), and the corresponding promise-making constraint (8)
by λmt (σ). Consistent with earlier notation, λ
k
t and λ
m
t are the collection of within-period
multipliers across σ ∈ Σ, and λ¯ks and λ¯ms are inﬁnite sequences of these from s on. The
space that λ¯ks and λ¯
m
s inhabit is denoted W∗.
Conﬁrming the existence of Lagrange multipliers in convex optimisation problems
generally requires the existence of a point that is strictly interior to the constraint set.44
Formally, we will make use of the following:
43The individual component of w¯s for period t and state σ is denoted wt (σ) in what follows, consistent
with the notation for promises.
44See, for instance, Luenberger (1969),8.3, Theorem 1.
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Deﬁnition. For any xs−1 ∈ X and ω¯s ∈ Ω (xs−1), we say that the corresponding con-
straint set for Problem 1 contains an interior point if there is an allocation (x¯′s, a¯
′
s) in
this constraint set that satisﬁes the following two inequalities for Π-almost all σ ∈ Σ and
all t ≥ s:
Et−1 [h (a′ (σ′) , σ′) + βωt+1 (σ′)|σ]− ωt (σ) ≥ ε
h (a′t (σ) , σ) + βωt+1 (σ)− h0 (a′t (σ) , σ) ≥ ε
for some ε > 0, independent of σ and t.
The existence of an inner point is not a trivial requirement. It is immediate, for
instance, that it cannot be satisﬁed when ω¯s lies at the boundary of Ω (xs−1).45 In
addition, the condition rules out the simple incorporation of equality constraints as two-
sided inequalities, since in this case interiority is impossible. Extensions to the main
arguments are possible that allow for linear forward-looking constraints, but we neglect
these to avoid over-complicating the analysis.46
Proposition 13. Suppose Assumptions 1, 4 and 5 hold. Fix xs−1 ∈ X, and let ω¯s ∈
Ω (xs−1) be such that the constraint set for Problem 1 contains an interior point. Then
wherever the directional derivative δV (ω¯s, xs−1; w¯s) exists and is ﬁnite-valued, there is
a pair of Lagrange multiplier sequences λ¯ks and λ¯
m
s in W∗ such that δV (ω¯s, xs−1; w¯s) is
given by:
δV (ω¯s, xs−1; w¯s) =
∞∑
t=s
βt−s
ˆ
σ∈Σ
{
β
[
λmt (σ) + λ
k
t (σ−)
]
wt+1 (σ)− λkt (σ)wt (σ)
}
dΠ (σ)
(58)
with σ− the predecessor history to σ.
Proof. Existence of the saddle point multipliers follows from direct application of The-
orem 1, 8.3 in Luenberger (1969), given assumptions 4 and 5. The promise-keeping
constraint can be rewritten for all t and σ as:
Et−1 [h (at (σ′) , σ′)|σ] ≥ γ (σ)
where γt (σ) := ωt (σ) − βEt [ωt+1 (σ′)|σ], so that the vector movement in promises w¯s
causes a per-unit change in γt (σ) of wt (σ)−βEt [wt+1 (σ′)|σ]. Hence, applying Theorem
45If it were, then a suﬃciently small change in promises in any direction would be consistent with the
existence of a feasible allocation. Hence we could not be at the boundary.
46Linear forward-looking equality constraints will most commonly arise in linear-quadratic problems,
in which case conventional techniques from linear analysis can provide an equivalent characterisation.
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1, 8.5 of Luenberger (1969), where the derivative exists it is given by:
δV (ω¯s, xs−1; w¯s) =
∞∑
t=s
βt−s
{ˆ
σ∈Σ
βλmt (σ)wt+1 (σ) dΠ (σ)
+
ˆ
σ∈Σ
λkt (σ) [βEt [wt+1 (σ′)|σ]− wt (σ)] dΠ (σ)
}
=
∞∑
t=s
βt−s
{ˆ
σ∈Σ
[
βλmt (σ)wt+1 (σ)− λkt (σ)wt (σ)
]
dΠ (σ)
+β
ˆ
σ∈Σ
ˆ
σ′∈Σ
λkt (σ)wt+1 (σ
′) dΠ (σ′|σ) dΠ (σ)
}
=
∞∑
t=s
βt−s
{ˆ
σ∈Σ
[
βλmt (σ)wt+1 (σ)− λkt (σ)wt (σ)
]
dΠ (σ)
+β
ˆ
σ∈Σ
λkt (σ−)wt+1 (σ) dΠ (σ)
}
where the last line applies Assumption 1, and σ− is the predecessor history to σ. This
delivers the stated expression under diﬀerentiability. (The right and left derivatives with-
out diﬀerentiability, discussed in the text, follow from identical logic, combined with the
concavity of V .)
All of the major characterisation results that follow will assume diﬀerentiability in V ,
applying condition (58), but a generalisation to points of non-diﬀerentiability would be
technically straightforward. Where the derivative δV (ω¯s, xs−1; w¯s) does not exist, there
is a set of Lagrange multipliers Λks × Λms ⊂ W∗ ×W∗ such that δ+V (ω¯s, xs−1; w¯s) is the
minimum in Λks ×Λms of the object on the right-hand side of (58), and δ−V (ω¯s, xs−1; w¯s)
is its maximum.
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C Problems with incentive compatibility constraints
In this section we sketch the arguments needed to extend the main characterisation
results, Propositions 7 to 9, to problems with incentive compatibility restrictions of the
form (6). This extension is used in the example of Section 9.3 in the main text, applying
the model of Atkeson and Lucas (1992). In all cases the extension is quite mechanical,
but expanded dimensionality in the constraint set makes the notation more burdensome.
This is why we relegate the treatment to an appendix.
Constraint (6) states:
Et
[ ∞∑
τ=0
βτh (at+τ (σt+τ ) , σt+τ )
∣∣∣∣∣σt
]
≥ Et
[ ∞∑
τ=0
βτh (at+τ (σ˜t+τ ) , σt+τ )
∣∣∣∣∣σt
]
(59)
We assume that σt is an inﬁnite history of draws of some stochastic variable θ ∈ Θ ⊆ R.
These draws are taken to be iid through time, so σt is not informative about the expected
sequence of draws from t + 1 on. Since incentive compatibility relates to the period-by-
period reporting decision, it is helpful to represent σt as (σt−1, θt), where σt−1 is an inﬁnite
past history of θ draws, and θt is the current realisation. The iid assumption means that
it does not matter in t whether σt−1 was a true history or simply a reported one. We
denote by pi (θ) the time-invariant density function of θ.
Given this, constraint (6) can be decomposed into promise-making and promise-
keeping restrictions as follows, for all (σ−, θ) ∈ Σ:
h (at (σ−, θ) , θ) + βωt+1 (σ−, θ) ≥ h
(
at
(
σ−, θ˜
)
, θ
)
+ βωt+1
(
σ−, θ˜
)
(60)
Et−1 [h (at (σ−, θ) , θ) + βωt+1 (σ−, θ)|σ−] = ωt (σ−) (61)
where (60) must hold for all θ˜ ∈ Θ.47 Note that the promise-keeping constraint (61)
must now be stated with equality: providing utility in excess of the required value may
violate incentive compatibility for those with alternative histories. These constraints and
the feasibility restrictions in (4) deﬁne an equivalent to the inner problem, Problem 1.
The value function associated with this problem can be denoted V (ω¯s, xs−1) as before.
The multiplier on constraint (60) is denoted λmt
(
σ−, θ, θ˜
)
, and on (61) it is λkt (σ−),
normalised by the relative measure of the σ and θ draws in both cases. Proceeding as
before, it is easy to show that if V is diﬀerentiable in the promise sequence then its
47In general only a small subset of these constraints will be binding at a chosen allocation.
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directional derivative along the dimension w¯s is given by:
δV (ω¯s, xs−1; w¯s) =
∑∞
t=s β
t−s ´
σ∈Σ
{
β
[ˆ
Θ
λmt
(
σ−, θ, θ˜
)
dθ˜ + λkt (σ−)
−
ˆ
Θ
λmt
(
σ−, θ˜, θ
) pi (θ˜)
pi (θ)
dθ˜
wt+1 (σ)
−λkt (σ)wt (σ)
}
dΠ (σ)
where σ := (σ−, θ). There are two main extensions here relative to the case in the main
text. First, a marginal increase in the promise value ωt+1 (σ−, θ) in principle relaxes an
entire set of promise-making constraints that are of relevance to agents whose true draw
is (σ−, θ)  hence the ﬁrst integral across alternative θ˜ reports. Second, an increase in this
promise value tightens the set of promise-making constraints for agents with the common
past (reported) history σ−, across all current θ˜ draws. The second of these ensures that
the term in square brackets in the derivative expression need not be positive, which
necessitates some adjustments to the analysis. Up to this qualiﬁcation, characterisation
results will proceed as before.
The equivalent statement to Proposition 7 now is:
Proposition 14. Suppose that the policy (x¯′s, a¯
′
s) is time-consistently undominated, given
some initial x′s−1 ∈ X, and assume that V is diﬀerentiable at the induced promise sequence
ω¯′s. When h is diﬀerence-comparable,
48 for Π-almost all σ ∈ Σ, either:
1. There is no period τ such that both
∣∣∣∣´Θ λmt (σ−, θ, θ˜) dθ˜ + λkt (σ−)− ´Θ λmt (σ−, θ˜, θ) pi(θ˜)pi(θ) dθ˜∣∣∣∣
and
∣∣λkt (σ)∣∣ are bounded above zero for all t ≥ τ .
or :
2. For all ρ ∈ (0, 1) and all positive scalars K1 and K2, it is possible to ﬁnd a τ ≥ s
and T > τ such that:
K1ρ
r−τ <
r−1∏
t=τ
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
λkt (σ)
β
[´
Θ
λmt
(
σ−, θ, θ˜
)
dθ˜ + λkt (σ−)−
´
Θ
λmt
(
σ−, θ˜, θ
)
pi(θ˜)
pi(θ)
dθ˜
]
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣ < K2
(
1
ρ
)r−τ
for all r ≥ T .
Proof. The proof mimics the diﬀerence comparable case above, with minor adjustments.
48Incentive compatibility constraints are commonly based on diﬀerence-comparable dynamic utility
functions, so we omit the case of ratio comparability.
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Suppose that there is geometric convergence in the product:
T−1∏
t=τ
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
λkt (σ)
β
[´
Θ
λmt
(
σ−, θ, θ˜
)
dθ˜ + λkt (σ−)−
´
Θ
λmt
(
σ−, θ˜, θ
)
pi(θ˜)
pi(θ)
dθ˜
]
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
to zero, i.e. for any τ ≥ s there exists a ρ ∈ (0, 1) and K > 0 such that for all T > τ :
KρT−τ >
T−1∏
t=τ
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
λkt (σ)
β
[´
Θ
λmt
(
σ−, θ, θ˜
)
dθ˜ + λkt (σ−)−
´
Θ
λmt
(
σ−, θ˜, θ
)
pi(θ˜)
pi(θ)
dθ˜
]
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
Let τ be such that both
∣∣∣∣´Θ λmt (σ−, θ, θ˜) dθ˜ + λkt (σ−)− ´Θ λmt (σ−, θ˜, θ) pi(θ˜)pi(θ) dθ˜∣∣∣∣ and∣∣λkt (σ)∣∣ are bounded above zero for all t ≥ τ  i.e., part 1 of the Proposition is not
true. Then choose wτ (σ) > 0 arbitrarily, and for all t ≥ τ set wt+1 (σ) recursively to
satisfy the condition:
β
ˆ
Θ
λmt
(
σ−, θ, θ˜
)
dθ˜ + λkt (σ−)−
ˆ
Θ
λmt
(
σ−, θ˜, θ
) pi (θ˜)
pi (θ)
dθ˜
wt+1 (σ) ≥ (1 + γ) ∣∣λkt (σ)wt (σ)∣∣
(62)
for some γ > 0 such that ρ (1 + γ) < 1, together the bounds: |wt+1 (σ)| ∈ [w, w¯], with w
and w¯ uniform in t. The feasibility of the upper bound w¯ here follows from the geometric
convergence in the product ratio to zero, and the possibility of satisfying a lower bound
is trivial. Given these values for the sequence {wt (σ)}t≥τ , set εt to satisfy:
εt = γ
∣∣λkt (σ)wt (σ)∣∣
The bounds on λkt (σ) and wt (σ) imply εt is bounded above zero. Using this in (62), we
have:
β
ˆ
Θ
λmt
(
σ−, θ, θ˜
)
dθ˜ + λkt (σ−)−
ˆ
Θ
λmt
(
σ−, θ˜, θ
) pi (θ˜)
pi (θ)
dθ˜
wt+1 (σ) ≥ (1 + γ) ∣∣λkt (σ)wt (σ)∣∣63)
=
∣∣λkt (σ)wt (σ)∣∣+ εt(64)
≥ λkt (σ)wt (σ) + εt (65)
If true for a positive-measure subset of σ ∈ Σ, this would imply a strict improvement for
all t ≥ τ  contradicting that the policy is time-consistently undominated. A symmetric
argument can be applied when the product ratio is exploding (see proof of Proposition 7
above) completing the proof.
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An equivalent to Proposition 8 goes through for this case with only cosmetic adjust-
ments to the proofs: a time-consistently undominated policy requires that the condition:
λkt+1 (σ)´
Θ
λmt
(
σ−, θ, θ˜
)
dθ˜ + λkt (σ−)−
´
Θ
λmt
(
σ−, θ˜, θ
)
pi(θ˜)
pi(θ)
dθ˜
= αt
is almost never violated at the limit as t→∞, where αt ∈ (0, 1] for all t.
The equivalent of Proposition 9 is:
Proposition 15. Consider a policy (x¯′s, a¯
′
s) that solves Problem 1 for the promise se-
quence that it induces, ω¯′s. The continuation of this policy (x¯
′
t, a¯
′
t) will belong to D
(
x′t−1
)
for all t ≥ s provided the following are true:
1. The value function V (ω¯s;xs−1) is concave in ω¯s.
2. (a) There exist positive scalars K and K¯ such that for all τ ≥ s, r > τ and σ ∈ Σ:
K ≤
r−1∏
t=τ
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
λkt (σ)
β
[´
Θ
λmt
(
σ−, θ, θ˜
)
dθ˜ + λkt (σ−)−
´
Θ
λmt
(
σ−, θ˜, θ
)
pi(θ˜)
pi(θ)
dθ˜
]
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ K¯
(66)
(b) There is a sequence of scalars {αt}∞t=s, with αt ∈ [α, α¯] for all t and 0 < α ≤
α¯ < 1, such that the multipliers converge across σ ∈ Σ as follows:
lim
t→∞
 λkt+1 (σ)
αt
[´
Θ
λmt
(
σ−, θ, θ˜
)
dθ˜ + λkt (σ−)−
´
Θ
λmt
(
σ−, θ˜, θ
)
pi(θ˜)
pi(θ)
dθ˜
]
 = 1
(67)
where the rate of convergence is at least linear.
The proof works identically to the proof of Proposition 9, substituting the object:
ˆ
Θ
λmt
(
σ−, θ, θ˜
)
dθ˜ −
ˆ
Θ
λmt
(
σ−, θ˜, θ
) pi (θ˜)
pi (θ)
dθ˜
for λmt (σ). Concavity of the value function for these problems will usually follow from the
linearity of the forward-looking constraints in the within-period utility function, together
with increasing marginal cost of providing utility.
Condition (66) implies that a policy satisfying the suﬃciency conditions can be in-
terpreted as a time-consistently optimal choice in a restricted-dimensional problem that
allows period-by-period choice across promises. In particular, the policy must satisfy the
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condition:
0 =
∑∞
t=s β
t−s ´
σ∈Σ
{
β
[ˆ
Θ
λmt
(
σ−, θ, θ˜
)
dθ˜ + λkt (σ−) (68)
−
ˆ
Θ
λmt
(
σ−, θ˜, θ
) pi (θ˜)
pi (θ)
dθ˜
 δt+1 (σ)
−λkt (σ) δt (σ)
}
dΠ (σ)
for all s ≥ 0, where {δt (σ)}t≥s is a bounded sequence of scalars for all σ ∈ Σ, with
limτ→∞ inft≥τ |δt (σ)| > 0 for Π-almost all σ. This corresponds to a within-period multi-
plier restriction:
β
ˆ
Θ
λmt
(
σ−, θ, θ˜
)
dθ˜ + λkt (σ−)−
ˆ
Θ
λmt
(
σ−, θ˜, θ
) pi (θ˜)
pi (θ)
dθ˜
 = λkt (σ) δt (σ)δt+1 (σ) (69)
A symmetric policy is deﬁned as one that allows policymakers in all periods the same
freedom to vary promises at the margin. This implies the simpler restriction:
β
ˆ
Θ
λmt
(
σ−, θ, θ˜
)
dθ˜ + λkt (σ−)−
ˆ
Θ
λmt
(
σ−, θ˜, θ
) pi (θ˜)
pi (θ)
dθ˜
 = λkt (σ) (70)
This is the condition used in the Atkeson-Lucas example in the main text (Section 9.3).
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D Applications: further details of calculations
D.1 Capital taxation
D.1.1 Inner problem
The implementability condition (28) can be decomposed using promise values into promise-
making and promise-keeping constraints, respectively:
uck,t
(
ckt + kt
) ≤ uck,tckt + βωt+1 (71)
ωt ≤ uck,tckt + βωt+1 (72)
The inner problem in period s is to maximise Ws subject to (26), (71) and (72) holding
for all t ≥ s, given ks−1 and ω¯s. First-order conditions for this problem with respect to
cwt , c
k
t and kt in turn are:
ucw,t − ηt = 0 (73)
µuck,t − ηt − λmt uckck,tkt + λkt
[
uck,t + uckck,tct
]
= 0 (74)
−ηt + βηt+1 [1 + fk,t+1 − δ]− λmt uck,t = 0 (75)
where ηt is the multiplier on the resource constraint (26).
D.1.2 Ramsey policy
Ramsey policy for period 0 is characterised by the ﬁrst-order multiplier conditions:
λk0 = 0 (76)
λkt = λ
k
t−1 + λ
m
t−1 (77)
for t > 0. Using these in (74) and (75) delivers a system of dynamic equations studied
by Straub and Werning (2015). As these authors show, for σ > 1 the result is for the
capital stock to converge to a `corner' solution. When µ is suﬃciently small, this involves
zero long-run consumption for workers, with just suﬃcient capital to ensure government
expenditure is sustained.
D.1.3 Time-consistently undominated policy
Given ratio comparability, a symmetric time-consistently undominated policy implies the
condition:
λktωt = β
(
λkt + λ
m
t
)
ωt+1 (78)
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for all t. Combining this with conditions (71) and (72), together with complementary
slackness, reduces it to:
λkt c
k
t = λ
m
t kt (79)
This allows λk and λm to be eliminated from (74) and (75), which collapse to the single
condition:
kt {βηt+1 [1 + fk,t+1 − δ]− ηt} = ckt
{
ηt − µuck,t
}
(80)
This is equation (29) in the main text.
D.2 Limited commitment
D.2.1 Inner problem
The forward-looking constraints can be decomposed into the following two promise-
making restrictions:
u (ct (σ)) + βωt+1 (σ) ≥ V (σ) (81)
u (ct (∞)) + βωt+1 (∞) ≥
u
(
yl
)
1− β (82)
where (82) is for σ > 0, and the following two promise-keeping restrictions:
Et−1 [u (ct (σ′)) + βωt+1 (σ′)|σ] ≥ ω (σ) (83)
u (ct (∞)) + βωt+1 (∞) ≥ ωt (∞) (84)
The time-consistent inner problem in period s maximisesWs subject to (32), and (81)
to (84), given the sequence of state-contingent promises ω¯s. Provided the utility function
is concave, ﬁrst-order conditions are necessary and suﬃcient for this. Normalising the
multipliers for population sizes, we require, for all t and all σ:49
u′ (ct (σ))
(
1 + λmt (σ) + λ
k
t (σ−)
)− ηt = 0 (85)
where ηt is again the resource multiplier. This is a standard optimality condition for a
cross-sectional allocation problem, with
(
1 + λmt (σ) + λ
k
t (σ−)
)
the eﬀective Pareto weight
on an agent of type σ. The only departure from a ﬁrst-best allocation is that Pareto
weights may be changing over time for a given individual.
49When σ = 0 the predecessor σ− may take on many values, and the condition could be rewritten to
allow for this by aggregating across corresponding values of λkt (σ−). However in practice this is precisely
the case in which the promise-making constraint binds, for both the Ramsey and TCUP solutions.
This means the combined Pareto weight
(
1 + λmt (σ) + λ
k
t (σ−)
)
always takes the same value for σ = 0,
irrespective of σ−. See below.
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D.2.2 Ramsey policy
Ramsey policy is characterised by the multiplier recursions:
λk0 (σ) = 0 (86)
λkt (σ) = λ
m
t−1 (σ) + λ
k
t−1 (σ−) (87)
for all σ ∈ Σ.
D.2.3 Time-consistently undominated policy
Under utilitarianism utility can be assumed to be diﬀerence-comparable, so that sym-
metric time-consistently undominated policy replaces the Ramsey multiplier condition
with:
λkt (σ) = β
[
λmt (σ) + λ
k
t (σ−)
]
(88)
for all σ ∈ Σ.
Again, the solution has the property that promise-making constraints only bind for
agents with σ = 0. This, together with the discounting and timing structure of (88),
allows the Pareto weight to be rewritten as:
1 + λmt (σ) + λ
k
t (σ−) = 1 + β
σλmt (0) (89)
D.3 Asymmetric information
D.3.1 Inner problem
Constraint (38) can be decomposed into `promise making' and `promise keeping' compo-
nents. The promise making constraint is:
θlu
(
ct
(
σ−, θl
))
+ βωt+1
(
σ−, θl
) ≥ θlu (ct (σ−, θh))+ βωt+1 (σ−, θh) (90)
for all σ− ∈ Σ.50 The promise keeping constraint is:
Et−1 [θu (ct (σ−, θ)) + βωt+1 (σ−, θ)|σ−] ≥ ωt (σ−) (91)
where expectations are taken across period-t θ draws.
The inner problem is to maximise (36) subject to (37), (90) and (91). The multiplier
on (90) is denoted λmt
(
σ−, θl
)
, consistent with the shock history of agents for whom it
binds. First-order conditions for this problem with respect to ct
(
σ−, θh
)
and ct
(
σ−, θl
)
50The notation (σ−, θ) denotes the history σ− followed by θ. Replacing (38) with this constraint
exploits the one-shot deviation principle.
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in turn are:
uc,t
(
ct
(
σ−, θh
))
θh
{
1 + λkt (σ−)− λmt
(
σ−, θl
) θl (1− p)
θhp
}
− ηt = 0 (92)
uc,t
(
ct
(
σ−, θl
))
θl
{
1 + λmt
(
σ−, θl
)
+ λkt (σ−)
}− ηt = 0 (93)
This can again be interpreted as the solution to a cross-sectional allocation problem in
which Pareto weights for the diﬀerent types are given by the objects in curly brackets.
Optimal choice of assets through time implies a standard Euler condition:
ηt = βRηt+1 (94)
Useful insight into the character of the solution is obtained by combining (92) and (93)
to yield:51
ηtEt−1
[
1
uc,t (ct (σ−, θ))
]
= 1 + λkt (σ−) (95)
D.3.2 Ramsey policy
A Ramsey-optimal choice implies the following conditions for the promise multipliers:
λkt
(
σ−, θh
)
= −λmt−1
(
σ−, θl
) 1− p
p
+ λkt−1 (σ−) (96)
λkt
(
σ−, θl
)
= λmt−1
(
σ−, θl
)
+ λkt−1 (σ−) (97)
for all σ− ∈ Σ, together with the normalisation:
λm−1 (σ) = λ
k
−1 (σ) = 0 (98)
for all σ ∈ Σ. Combining (96) and (97) gives:
Et
[
λkt+1 (σ−, θ)
]
= λkt (σ−) (99)
That is, the promise-keeping multiplier follows a martingale process. Using this in (95),
together with (94), gives the inverse Euler condition (39) in the main text.
D.3.3 Time-consistently undominated policy
In this problem promises correspond to utility values, and since the policymaker is util-
itarian these must be diﬀerence comparable across individuals with diﬀerent σ draws.
51This uses the normalisation θ¯ = 1, and the independence of λkt (σ−) with respect to the period-t
shock.
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The extension of the symmetric multiplier condition (23) to this case implies:52
λkt
(
σ−, θh
)− β [−λmt (σ−, θl) 1− pp + λkt (σ−)
]
= 0 (100)
λkt
(
σ−, θl
)− β [λmt (σ−, θl)+ λkt (σ−)] = 0 (101)
Replacing the Ramsey conditions (96) and (97) with these delivers the symmetric time-
consistently undominated solution. A useful contrast is obtained by combining (100) and
(101) to give:
Et−1
[
λkt (σ−, θ)
]
= βλkt (σ−) (102)
Thus promise-keeping multipliers decay at rate β in expectation along a sample path
for past type draws, but again this is true within a given period t. The cross-sectional
equivalent of the inverse Euler equation, condition (40), can then be obtained, using (95).
52See Appendix C
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